



Measuring media oriented terrorism

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ABSTRACT

Although long established, media oriented terrorist events have not been conceptualized or measured in a coherent manner. To forward the empirical study of media oriented terrorism, a measure that can be applied to terrorist events or to terrorist groups was developed and employed to compare terrorist activity for twenty terrorist groups and two hundred terrorist events. The media orientation measure taps into five factors of media orientation and successfully differentiates high from low media orientated events and active and inactive media oriented terrorist groups. The single most important factor regarding any group's individual media orientation level was their base of operation. Terrorist groups that were engaged in regional struggles were found to be less media oriented. Despite the news value of death and injury, the terrorist group with the highest fatality and injury averages ranked ninth in its media orientation score indicating that death and injury was not a necessary indicator of media orientation. Scores further suggest that media savvy well-known terrorist groups did not pursue media oriented activity as a constant strategy.

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Introduction

Today's terrorist often choreographs attacks to garner media attention (Farnen, 1990; Ross, 2007; Schmid, 1989; Weimann & Winn, 1994). Media oriented terrorism refers to terrorism that is purposely carried out to attract attention from the media, and through them, the general public (Martin, 2006). The desire for media attention is not a constant feature of terrorism and the degree of media orientation a terrorist group displays during specific acts or during a prescribed time period will vary. One terrorist act will be more media oriented than another terrorist act and one terrorist group will be more or less media oriented compared with another terrorist group or compared with itself at different time periods. In the study of terrorism, media orientation has not, however, been developed as a measurable research concept.

This deficiency is unfortunate in that as the twenty-first century unfolds, the media play an increasing role not only in the recording and reporting of terrorist events, but also in the process of target selection and actions taken by terrorist groups. Contemporary terrorist methods and targets are selected with the goal of widespread media attention in order to deliver the terrorists' messages to distant audiences. Of course, a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and publicity has existed for centuries.¹ Previously, before mass communication, terrorists were more often satisfied with reaching local audiences with a hoped for, but unreliable effect on distant audiences. What has changed are the means available to disseminate terrorist messages. Pre-mass media terrorism had to rely on after the event

word-of-mouth dissemination and by default; intended audiences were largely local and limited.

It follows that a common historical problem for the terrorist was reaching an audience beyond the instant target (Alexander & Picard, 1991; Crelinsten, 2002; Gutmann, 1979; Snowden & Whitsel, 2005). To achieve this goal today, terrorists need an act of sufficient magnitude to gain media attention, a setting for the act which facilitates communication, and audience access (Lukaszewski, 1987).² The roots of the media oriented terrorist era are traceable to nineteenth century anarchists and their concept of 'propaganda of the deed.'³ The modern era for media oriented terrorism is set by Alex Schmid and Jenny de Graaf to the late 1960s (see also Midlarsky, Crenshaw, & Yoshida, 1980). Schmid and de Graaf (1982) note that contemporary terrorism came to be defined by a "violent communication strategy":

The news media plays a prominent role in linking up the terrorist with his victim, his enemy and the public at large...the period of 1968–1979, when television, linked up internationally by satellite, provided a similar audience increase as did the rotary press in the days of anarchist terrorism. (p. 16)

Media oriented terrorism was better suited to television as opposed to print journalism because television has little time for exposition and requires an event that is highly visual and compact. Since the 1970s, terrorist acts are more likely to receive media coverage if they follow the canons of television entertainment and newsworthiness—scarcity, unexpectedness, hostility to elite people or nations, violence, intensity, and unambiguity (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Weimann & Winn, 1994). A recent example of this visual media orientation is provided

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by Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh who chose to bomb the Murray Federal Building in 1995 because, among other reasons, it had “plenty of open space around it, to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage” (Nacos, 2002, p. 12).

The advent of postmodern mass media communication systems immensely increased the benefits of media coverage for terrorists and media oriented terrorist events are now a commonly accepted element of terrorism (Crelinsten, 2002; Martin, 2006; Ross, 2007).⁴ Given the opportunity to quickly reach multiple and distant audiences, the modern media oriented terrorist understands that acts that receive limited media coverage are lost opportunities (Martin, 2006; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). Through the media, impacts far out of proportion to a terror group's own strength can be achieved. A small group can oblige an entire country or global audience to pay heed to the group's agenda even if the group is, in fact, too weak to seize and occupy a small village (Weimann & Winn, 1994).

Understanding media oriented terrorism

The nature of media oriented terrorism can be understood via interpretative communities as described by Thomas Lindlof (1988). An interpretative community is defined as a social group that shares both knowledge and perspectives and collectively arrives at an interpretation of events that come to the group's attention. Each different interpretative community constructs its meanings for an event and a single event can have widely different meanings across different interpretative communities. Lindlof argues that mediated communication practices create interpretative communities in substantially different ways than direct social interactions. A media audience is therefore considered a community that exists through shared assumptions and mediated communications. Contemporary societies with advanced media systems will create diverse and coexisting interpretative communities (Lindlof, 1988, pp. 102–103).

Applying these ideas to media oriented terrorism, the multiple audience targeting of media oriented terrorist acts can be understood as multiple interpretative communities. For example, Islamic terrorists can be perceived as one interpretive community, their targets as another, Westerners as another, other Islamic terrorist groups as a fourth, and Muslims worldwide as a fifth. Each community–audience interprets the same event within its own shared assumptions and communication tenets. A single terrorist act can therefore reach and affect multiple audiences in widely different ways (Martin, 2006). In the case of terrorist events, the interpretative audiences are diverse, disparate, and dispersed—often sharing little in terms of culture, history, or world views. In pragmatic terms, the meaning of a media oriented terrorist act is not an intrinsic quality of the act but is developed post hoc within different communities interpreting the terrorist act (Lindlof, 1988). Conceiving terrorism as mediated communication and media oriented acts as simultaneous communication with different interpretative communities, media oriented terrorism fits into Lindlof's (1988) conceptualization as a special genre of social interactions—communities, in this case terrorist ones, that use media to steer social action.

Suicide terrorism provides a working example. Pape (2003; see also Gupta & Mundra, 2005) in a study of sixteen suicide bombing campaigns from 1980 to 2001 suggested that suicide bombings diffuse throughout terrorism groups as other innovative successful techniques diffuse throughout mainstream professions (see Rogers, 2003). Pape described three categories of contemporary terrorist acts—demonstrative, destructive, and suicide terrorism. Demonstrative terrorism is aimed mainly at gaining publicity but minimize harm and are, in that regard, analogous to media oriented terrorism. In these acts, terrorists “want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1975, p. 4). Destructive terrorism seeks to inflict real harm and includes assassinations and crowd-targeted bombings as exemplars. Suicide terrorism, felt by Pape to be the most aggressive form of

terrorism, can also be demonstrative or destructive. Suicide terrorism can be demonstrative (if, for example, a bomber kills only himself/herself in a public setting) or destructive (the suicide bomber kills another specific targeted individual). In practice, suicide bombers usually simply aim to kill the largest number of people to maximize the coercive leverage of their act (Pape, 2003). Suicide campaigns have often aimed to coerce democracies to make significant territorial concessions. Suicide terrorism, like media oriented terrorism, is strategic. It has a rational goal and historically has been successful and has been utilized by both religious (Islamic) and secular groups (i.e., the Liberation Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist/Leninist group).

Similarly media targeted terrorist events are aimed at democracies and not totalitarian states because of the latter's suppression of publicity without which there exists no reason for a terrorist media event to be created (Cram, 2006; Laqueur, 1999). As simultaneously aimed at terrorist home population and some distant foreign population, media oriented terrorist events are conceived herein as spanning all three of Pape's (2003) categories. They are demonstrative, can be destructive, and like some suicide bombings, especially those that are part of a series, can be part of a coercive terrorist campaign carried out via the media.

This marriage of media and terrorism was accelerated by modern terrorists taking on the organizational characteristics of small businesses which have made them more media sophisticated (Weimann & Winn, 1994). Like businesses, today's media oriented terrorist takes advantage of “real time,” technology driven and worldwide broadcast opportunities afforded by a variety of Web sites, broadcast journalism, and media outlets. A number of terrorist groups have established above-ground organizations that promote media relations (Martin, 2006). Generic benefits of media attention include the enhanced distribution of messages to multiple audiences, the suggestion of future potential targets, and the improved morale of supporters. Victim reactions and forced shifts in public opinion toward victim governments and institutions, plus access to global forums are additional benefits (Martin, 2006; Pillar, 2001). Spurred by these rewards, media oriented terrorists have become adept at manipulating the news triage process that propels dramatic news with emotional human interest content to the forefront and grants coverage to those groups who successfully create dramatic telegenic events (Martin, 2006). The modern terrorist media mantra is: “We give the media what they need: newsworthy events. They cover us, explain our causes and legitimize us” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 61). The unavoidable off-spring of this marriage is the media oriented terrorist event. While media oriented terrorist events are a persistent reality in the contemporary world and their importance in the global terrorism dynamic acknowledged, the concept has not been clearly defined or operationalized (Ross, 2007).

Conceptualizing media oriented terrorism

Media oriented terrorism requires a communication intent that includes such elements as credit-taking, media usable communiqués, and symbolic targets and actions. The timing, the environment, the target, and audience of the attack are important as are the effects of the message on different audience members (Drake, 1998; Tuman, 2003). These events are focused less on individual victims and more on victim types—their country of origin, occupation, or economic status. The victims symbolize both the enemy and the terrorist cause, and targets and locations are chosen to maximize media and public attention. A key indicator of media oriented terrorism is its symbolism. Clear immediate tactical goals are not necessary, but the symbolic nature of the terrorist act should be apparent. Media oriented terrorists also often strive to involve journalists by the pre-alerting of the media of an event, to be available for interviews, and to provide images of events or victims to news agencies. Additional media oriented event indicators include the announcing or self-

identification of a group's association with an event, attacks on victims from newsworthy countries or who hold high profile positions in religious, business, or political organizations. Lastly, media oriented terrorist events are also hypothesized to involve a significant number of fatalities and injuries and as methodologically unique to increase their news value. Conversely, they are usually nonmonetary.

No single indicator is felt to be a requisite for a terrorist act to be a media oriented terrorism event. For example, a terrorist act with a high number of fatalities or injuries may not be media oriented. The highly media oriented secular terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Red Army Faction and Red Army Brigade did not aim to kill or injure a large number of people and not one of the victims of the Iran hostage crisis died. Conversely, many people could be injured as an unanticipated consequence of an act—a hijacking for transportation, for example, resulting in a plane crash. Media oriented terrorist events and non-media terrorist events are conceived as two terminals of a continuum. Any individual terrorist act falls along the media oriented continuum and terrorist groups are expected to rank as more or less media oriented. The logic of the conceptualization is that the more indicators that are present, the more media oriented an event is felt to be.

As reflected in Fig. 1, hypothesized indicators of non-media orientation include unclaimed attacks where no responsibility is sought, the absence of tapes or images of the attack or victims, the event occurs in a low news value country, the victims are unknown or low profile, and the act influences a local population only. Non-media oriented events usually have a common target and employ a standard terrorist tactic such as a bombing. Having a clear immediate tactical goal most readily identifies them. For example, the anonymous unclaimed bombing of a power plant to cut electricity to a local community would not be a media oriented event. Media attention is not crucial for successful impact. Some events display some media oriented characteristics such as uniqueness, but do not qualify as media oriented. An example is the “successful” parachute hijacking in November 1971 by “D. B. Cooper” who jumped out of a DC-8 with \$200,000 in extortion money. Although this event was unique and received a large amount of media attention, it clearly was not designed as media oriented. Several well-known terrorist events exemplify the concept in Table 1.

What these events share is their media oriented characteristics—visual events, journalism access, high newsworthiness, and a planned or fortuitous construction that aides media dissemination. Even the failed events such as the Munich Olympic attacks produced media related benefits of instant terrorist group fame, increased group visibility, worldwide discussion of group causes, and the ability to simultaneously reach distant attending audiences (Lindlof, 1988; Pape, 2003; Ross, 2007).

Given the recognition of media oriented terrorism in the literature (Martin, 2006; Ross, 2007; Schmid, 1989; Schmid & de Graaf, 1982; Weimann & Winn, 1994), a gap in the research was that no empirical assessments of media orientation existed in the extant literature (Ross, 2007). In order to address this gap, a media orientation measure was developed utilizing a set of recent terrorist events obtained from the *Terrorism Knowledge Base* (n.d.), a publicly available worldwide terrorism data base maintained by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.⁵

Measuring media orientation

Data

Terrorist event data are stored chronologically, can be searched in a straight forward manner, and are classified by perpetrator, dates, locations, and other relevant factors in the *Terrorism Knowledge Base* (n.d.) (hereafter TKB). Thus, the TKB data were utilized to develop a media oriented terrorism scale. The TKB data base contains data on over 24,000 terror incidents within a listing of terrorist attacks from January 1, 1968 to the present. TKB classifies attacks by date, perpetrators, location, method of attack, number of injuries, fatalities, and hostages; whether Americans were targeted; and a brief summary. Events are culled from open source materials for the TKB data set.⁶ TKB data are chronologically inclusive but as an open-sourced based data set, undercounts the total number of terrorist events but taps well into the pool of media oriented events and makes them particularly apt for a study of media oriented terrorism. For this effort, individual terror attacks that were attributed to or claimed for twenty different terrorist groups were compiled and deconstructed. The sample of terrorist groups was not random, but was selected to




Fig. 1. Indicators of media oriented and non-media oriented terrorist events.

Table 1
Benchmark media oriented terrorist events

Terrorist event	Description
1972 Munich Olympics	Eight Palestinian terrorists from the group Black September scale a fence at the Olympic village and stormed the complex housing Israeli athletes, killed two Israeli athletes and took another nine hostage. With close to one billion viewers in one hundred countries watching, the Palestinian cause catapulted up the world agenda. The nine remaining hostages were killed by their captors along with five terrorists and one German policeman after a failed rescue effort. The potential benefits of media oriented terrorism, even when tactically unsuccessful, were demonstrated two years later when PLO leader Yasser Arafat addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations and the PLO was subsequently granted observer status in the U.N. in November 1975.
1979 U.S. Embassy seizure in Tehran, Iran	Instigated by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, in 1979 Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran taking about seventy American hostages ("The Hostage Crisis in Iran," 2006). Nightly ABC's news special reports on the crisis became the long-running television news magazine program "Nightline." Both Walter Cronkite and Dan Rather ended their daily broadcasts by reciting the number of days the hostages had been held (Murphy, 2001). On inauguration day, January 20, 1981, the remaining U.S. hostages were released after 444 days in captivity.
1985 TWA hijacking	On June 14, 1985, members of the Lebanese Shiite Muslim group, Islamic Amal, commandeered a TWA jetliner in Athens, Greece. As the terrorist flew the plane from Athens to Beirut to Algiers and back to Algiers, an American Navy diver was beaten and fatally shot. The hijackers manipulated the world's media by granting orchestrated interviews, holding press conferences, and manipulating information given to news outlets by selecting hostages to be interviewed and editing their remarks (Martin, 2006). Over the sixteen days of the crisis, the three American networks devoted over 60 percent of their broadcast time, dozens of staff and reporters were sent to cover the story, and the evening news changed and expanded its format to include special reports, newsbreaks, exclusives, and experts in terrorism (Weimann, 2004).
1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing	On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh exited a Ryder truck packed with 7,000 pounds of explosives outside of the Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City. Minutes later, an explosion killed 169 Americans. McVeigh was arrested ninety minutes afterwards. McVeigh chose to bomb the Murray Federal Building for, among other reasons, because it had "plenty of open space around it, to allow for the best possible news photos and television footage" (Nacos, 2002, p. 12).
September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks	Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial aircraft in mid-flight and flew two of them into the World Trade Center Towers in New York City, and one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The fourth crashed in Pennsylvania due to passenger heroics. The Trade Center Towers in New York were selected by al-Qaeda because of their symbolic value of the United State's economy with the terrorism goal of shifting them to be a "new symbol of U.S. vulnerability" (Tuman, 2003, p. 65).
Web beheadings	On February 20, 2002, Daniel Pearl, a kidnapped American reporter for the <i>Wall Street Journal</i> collecting information in Pakistan about now convicted shoe bomber Richard Reid and his relationship to al-Qaeda, was beheaded in Pakistan. A graphic video was released of his murder (Seper, 2007). The subsequent May 11, 2004 posting of the Nick Berg beheading by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been called the "9/11 of jihad on the Internet" and the posting of the video set off a number of copycat beheadings in the Middle East and elsewhere (Glasser & Coll, 2005, p. A01).

represent political, religious, and environmental perspectives from different parts of the world and to tap into the different types of terrorist group classifications within the TKB data base. Terrorist group and event selection was guided by the following logic.

First, in recognition that the TKB data were adjusted by the organization that compiled the data on January 1, 1998 to include international and domestic terrorist incidents, the incidents chosen for this study fell between the dates of January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2006 as of February 6, 2007. Before January 1, 1998, the TKB data included only international terrorist incidents. With the January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2006 temporal boundary, the next step was to select the ten most recent incidents for each selected group.

As stated, terrorist group selection was purposeful with the goal of achieving both a geographic and qualitative range. As reported in Table 2, the twenty terrorist groups chosen fell into four subsets: environmental, al-Qaeda linked, religious, and political. There were two environmental, five al-Qaeda linked, five religious, and eight political terrorist groups included. The two environmental groups chosen were the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, the only two environmental terrorist groups to have a sufficient number of incidents. The five al-Qaeda related groups chosen were al-Qaeda and four additional terrorist groups listed as "allies" of al-Qaeda in the TKB data base. The four al-Qaeda ally groups were chosen from a

list of twenty-five listed al-Qaeda allied terrorist groups. The terrorist groups of Abu Sayyaf Group, Ansar al-Sunnah Army, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers were chosen from different geographic regions to provide a global spread. The five religious groups chosen were selected from the original TKB list of 207 religious oriented terrorist groups. The Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah were chosen due to their name recognition and high incident numbers. The remaining two groups, Lord's Resistance Army and Free Aceh Movement, were chosen because they were the most active non-Middle Eastern religious terrorist groups.

The eight political groups chosen were broken down further into three subgroups: anti-globalization, national/separatist, and communist/socialist. There were only two anti-globalization terrorist groups that qualified with enough incidents in the selected time frame from the TKB listing of thirty-one such groups. The two chosen were the Revolutionary Nuclei and the Breton Revolutionary Army due to their geographic locations. The three national/separatist groups chosen from 333 TKB listed groups were the Irish Republican Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem, and Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade. These chosen groups were from locations not already represented and all three had high total incident numbers. The three communist/socialist groups chosen possessed the highest total incident number from the 147 initial groups and included the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. Appendix A provides a brief overview of each group.

Table 2
Selected terrorist group distribution

Group categories	Number of groups
al-Qaeda	5
Environment	2
Religion	5
Political	
Communist	3
Anti-global	2
National	3

Limitations of the research design

The incidents included in the TKB data were collected through open source materials such as newspapers. This was advantageous since this study was focused on media related questions, but it limited the information that was provided. An additional limitation was that each group's media oriented score represented its recent activity, not its historical media orientation. A terrorist group may have committed

ten recent incidents that collectively had low media orientation scores, but had a long-term history that would indicate a level of recurring media orientation. It was expected that the scale scores for any individual terrorist group would vary by times and samples.⁷ Thus, the findings presented should not be interpreted as measures of a group's historical media orientation. Instead, they reflected a group's recent media oriented activities and provided a cross-section snapshot of media oriented activity across a set of terrorist groups.

If the conceptualization of media oriented terrorism was correct, the highest scoring incident for each group should also receive the most media coverage. The correlation between media orientation scores and coverage was not able to be assessed, however, because information regarding coverage amounts by incident could not be narrowed down to only include the media coverage of a specific terrorist incident in available news data bases. The news media data bases searched included: Newslibrary, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and Lexis Nexis Academic.

Based on the reasoning that terrorist groups who see themselves engaged with Western enemies will be media oriented to reach these distant audiences, it was hypothesized that terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Taliban would score high on the media orientation scale. Conversely, groups who were engaged in regional conflicts and were more focused on local or regional audiences were expected to score lower.

Scoring media oriented terrorism

For each terrorist group selected, their ten most recent events were graded on twelve dimensions to measure the extent that each group had recently pursued media related goals. For each terrorist act, points were summed and an overall average calculated for each group. The resulting scale was arbitrarily conceptualized as scores in the 0 to 3 range would reflect low media orientation, scores in the 4 to 8 range as medium level media orientation, and scores in the 9 to 12 range as high media orientation. The media oriented terrorism scores were derived from twelve factors.

An example is provided for scoring the individual events. On December 30, 2006, Basque Fatherland of Freedom detonated a bomb in the parking garage of the Madrid airport. Two individuals were killed and twenty-six were injured. The terrorist group warned officials of the event prior to the detonation and gave a statement to the media afterwards. The event received one point for warning/informing officials, one point for giving a statement, one point for striking a Western target, one point for striking the Western target on Western soil, one point for claiming responsibility for the event, and one point for having more than ten injuries. There were no images distributed by the group, the target was not high profile, it was not directed at a distant audience, it was not a symbolic attack, and it was not brutal or unique. Therefore this event was not awarded points in the latter categories and the total media oriented terrorism score for this terrorist act was six points. A similar scoring procedure was applied to the two hundred terrorist events included in the study (see Appendix B).

Reflecting the sample design, the two hundred included events were broadly distributed among counties and across regions of the world. Ten percent of the terrorist events occurred in the United States, 9.5 percent in Iraq, and 8 percent in Israel. The countries of Afghanistan, Columbia, France, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Kashmir, Nepal, Philippines, Russia, Spain, and Sri Lanka all had about 5 percent of the events occur in their territories. The countries Bangladesh, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen had comparatively few events on their soil—3 percent or less. The types of victims associated with these two hundred events were also varied. Citizens, private property, government, police, and business targets were most common and made up the majority of victim types. The balance of

targets included infrastructure targets such as utilities and transportation, religious leaders and institutions, and other terrorist groups and former terrorists.

Findings

Reflecting that most events were not media oriented, the two hundred event sample had an average event score of 1.69 with more than half scoring either a 1 or 0. When each of the sample's twenty terrorist groups events were summed, group totals ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 37, with a mean total of 16.9, and a standard deviation of 10.9. Each terrorist group's total score was divided by ten to provide final group averages that reflected the 0 to 12 score range developed previously (see Fig. 2). Table 3 reports these average media orientation scores for each of the twenty selected terrorist groups ranked from highest to lowest. Interpretations of the results, additional observations, and discussion of the individual group and terrorist category scores follow.

The first finding of note was that group average media orientation scores clustered toward the lower end of the possible 0 to 12 score range with only three groups averaging scores greater than 3. High scoring media oriented terrorist events were extremely rare. The six well-known heavily covered benchmark events listed in Table 1 for example, ranged from 4 to 9 when scored and only averaged a 7.2 score.⁸ None of the twenty selected terrorist groups had an average score in the high media orientation range during the data selection period (the single highest scoring event scored a 6 and was conducted by the Basque Fatherland and Freedom group). It was also noteworthy that some of the groups noted in the literature as particularly media savvy, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, scored in the lower half of the groups indicating that the production of media oriented terrorist events by any individual terrorist group, even ones credited as attuned to the media, was a volatile activity.⁹ Supported by the observation that more than half of the examined terrorist groups in this study averaged less than 2 on the scale, it was reasonable to conclude that terrorist groups vary their media orientation depending upon the near-term goals of their terror campaign.

With that observation in mind, the highest scoring groups in this sample were the two environmental terror groups, the Animal Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) scored a 3.7 on the media orientation scale and the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) scored a 3.3. An example of eco-terrorism was the August 2003, ELF arson at a Chevrolet dealership in California in which 125 vehicles including Hummers and other SUVs were torched causing over \$2.3 million in damages. The group spray painted "ELF" and "Fat, Lazy Americans" at the dealership. The ELF and ALF groups represented some of the most media savvy groups in this study and their habit of claiming their acts and their high Web visibility aided their comparatively high media orientation score (Joosse, 2007). Their position as the first and second highest terrorist groups was also noteworthy when their 0 average injury and fatality rate was considered. They clearly wanted a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead (Leader & Probst, 2003). Despite the news value of death and injury, both groups demonstrated the ability to pursue media attention without physical harm to victims. These two groups operated mostly in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom and directed their claims to Western media outlets, thus, they scored consistently higher than the other eighteen terrorist groups examined on the media orientation scale. In contrast, the group with the highest fatality and injury averages, the Riyadh us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade, ranked ninth in its media orientation score.

The next three terrorist groups were political, one each from the three political subgroups. Representing a communist political terrorist group, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom group scored a 3.1 on the scale due to their claiming many of their bombings of government offices, banks, and airports. Next was an anti-global terrorist group,

Involves journalists or media by:	
1 point	Informing media of event or purpose
1 point	Providing statement or interview
1 point	Posting or distributing images
1 point	Announcing or identifying group's association with an act
Attacks a victim or target that is:	
1 point	Victims from United States or other Western country
1 point	High profile due to occupation, religious, or political status
1 point	Event occurs in United States or other Western country
1 point	Symbolic non-tactical value
Event is:	
1 point	Nonmonetary kidnapping, hijacking, or hostages
1 point	Aimed at distant audience
1 point	Five or more fatalities or ten or more injuries
1 point	Unique or brutal
<p>Note: To receive a point for targeting Westerners, targets had to be an American or from an allied Western country; or the facility or building targeted was specifically designated as a U.S. or allied military compound. To receive a point for the high profile occupation, religious, or political category the person or place must have preexisting news value. To receive a point for symbolic attack value, the attack must be on a well-known site location or an event must occur on a celebration or holiday date. To receive a point for distant audience, the attack must be aimed at a target owned, controlled, or clearly connected to a distant population (an embassy for example). To qualify as "unique or brutal," the attack must employ either a rarely used technique, torture, or a gruesome death.</p>	

Fig. 2. Measures of media oriented terrorism (one point for presence of each factor, else zero).

the Breton Revolutionary Army, which averaged a score of 2.9, followed by a national political terrorist group, the Irish Republican Army, which averaged a media orientation score of 2.6. All three of these groups were based in western European countries, Spain, France, and Ireland respectively, boosting their scores. It was not until rank six that the first al-Qaeda terrorist affiliations group appeared.

Looking at the five al-Qaeda groups collectively, it can be seen that al-Qaeda dominated the upper middle quartile ranks (six through ten) but one al-Qaeda group appeared as low as seventeenth in rank.¹⁰ Reflecting the decentralized nature of the al-Qaeda organization, the al-Qaeda groups' scores varied widely, ranging from 2.5 for al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers to a low of 0.8 for the Abu Sayyaf Group.¹¹ Aaron Mannes (2004) summarized al-Qaeda's strategic philosophy which translated into an inconsistent interest in creating media oriented events:

Recognizing the conventional superiority of the United States, al-Qaeda has devoted extensive resources to studying non-conventional means in an effort to equalize the conflict. An article in al-Ansar, an online journal affiliated with al-Qaeda, revealed their familiarity with the discussion of fourth generation and asymmetric warfare in the West. These concepts focus on striking high-profile critical targets and using the mass media to undermine the target society's will to fight. Al-Qaeda's target selection reflects this strategy. The attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen sent a message of the vulnerability of American military assets. The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were attacks on prominent symbols of American commercial and military prowess. (p. 51)

The variation in al-Qaeda group scores can be further understood by examining the areas of operation associated with each of the five al-Qaeda groups. The higher scoring al-Qaeda groups operated worldwide or in the Middle East where the United States was militarily

engaged. Conversely, the lower scoring affiliated al-Qaeda groups operated in Southeast Asia and the Philippines—both areas of low news value to the world media.

The Taliban, known for supporting and harboring Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, was also in the second quartile group. The Taliban was a non-state terrorist organization that targeted the new government of Afghanistan and local high profile victims such as police chiefs, council candidates, mayors, and Western military and security personnel. This group scored 2.1 on the media orientation scale. On March 17, 2005, in a fairly typical attack, Taliban members set off a remote-detonated bomb in a taxi that killed five and wounded over thirty civilians and another that blew up an NGO (nongovernment organization) truck without injuring anyone. The bombings were done in conjunction with a visit from U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

The lower middle quadrant (ranks eleven through fifteen) was dominated by religious terrorist groups. The five groups in these ranks hovered around an average media oriented terrorism scale score of 1 for their past ten events and included two groups with high name recognition in the West— Hamas and Hezbollah. Hamas, whose base of operations was in Gaza and the Occupied Territories, used suicide bombings as one of its chief methods of terrorist attacks (Gupta & Mundra, 2005). According to the TKB data, they chose Israeli civilians and property in about 84 percent of their attacks. Hamas often targeted police, bus stations, crowded malls and restaurants, hotels, and discos. They historically took credit for deaths and injuries and provided detailed statements to the media which described an attack as retaliation for the death of a Hamas member. Despite their reputation for media manipulation, they scored a low 0.9 on the media orientation scale in this recent time frame sample. Their score, as well as Hezbollah's identical score, suggested that already well-known terrorist groups need not pursue media oriented terrorist acts as a constant strategy.¹² Groups may be media oriented, perhaps when starting up, and become less media oriented after they become

Table 3
Average media orientation score of selected terrorist groups

Average media orientation score	Terrorist group	Type	Country	Percent Western target	Mean injury	Mean fatality	Highest scoring single event	Lowest scoring single event
3.7	Animal Liberation Front (1976)	Environmental	Canada, U.S., U.K.	100%	0.0	0.0	4	3
3.3	Earth Liberation Front (1992)	Environmental	Canada, U.S., U.K.	100%	0.0	0.0	4	2
3.1	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (1959)	Political-communist	Spain	100%	3.0	0.2	6	2
2.9	Breton Revolutionary Army (1998)	Political -anti-global	France	80%	0.1	0.1	4	1
2.6	Irish Republican Army (1922)	Political-national	Ireland	100%	0.3	0.2	5	2
2.5	al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers (2004)	al-Qaeda group	Iraq, Jordan	0%	26.8	11.6	4	1
2.4	Al-Qaeda (1988)	al-Qaeda group	Worldwide	40%	9.1	5.4	4	1
2.1	Taliban (1994)	Religious	Afghanistan	10%	3.7	4.4	4	0
2.0	Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade (2002)	Political - national	Russia, Chechnya	0%	85.6	44.2	5	1
1.6	Ansar al-Sunnah Army (2003)	al-Qaeda Group	Iraq	0%	2.1	2.5	4	1
1.4	Revolutionary Nuclei (1974)	Political - anti-global	Greece	20%	0.0	0.0	3	1
1.1	Lashkar-e-Taiba (2000)	al-Qaeda group	India, Kashmir, Pakistan	0%	5.9	2.2	2	0
1.0	Hamas (1987)	Religious	Israel, Gaza, West Bank	0%	0.0	0.0	1	1
0.9	Hezbollah (1982)	Religious	Lebanon	0%	2.1	0.8	3	0
0.9	Lord's Resistance Army (1992)	Religious	Uganda, Democratic Republic of Sudan, Congo	0%	4.4	6.5	2	0
0.9	Free Aceh Movement (1975)	Religious	Indonesia, Malaysia, Sweden	10%	1.4	0.6	4	0
0.8	Abu Sayyaf Group (1991)	al-Qaeda group	Philippines	0%	13.6	1.1	2	0
0.4	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeem (1976)	Political - national	Sri Lanka	0%	2.0	0.7	2	0
0.1	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (1964)	Political - communist	Columbia	0%	1.3	3.7	1	0
0.1	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (1996)	Political - communist	India, Nepal	0%	0.3	0.5	1	0

established. It is speculated that one impetus toward reduced media oriented terrorism is, ironically, becoming part of a pseudo-establishment and assuming traditionally governmental responsibilities such as education and health care, as was the case with Hamas.

The bottom five groups were dominated by varied political terrorists and all scored less than 1 as their average media orientation scale score. More than their terrorist group classification, their low media orientation scores were attributed to their bases of operations—the Philippines, Africa, South American, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia. Operating out of the primary view of the Western media, these groups were expected to be less attuned to media attention, and as the low scoring al-Qaeda group attested, have a more difficult time garnering it if they wished to do so. Two communist terror groups occupied the lowest rungs of the table, both averaging scores of 0.1 for their last ten attacks. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) group was formed in the 1960s, and according to TKB, was committed to a Marxist overthrowing of the Colombian government. FARC targeted the government in 32 percent and utilities in 20 percent of their attacks. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) had vowed to overthrow the Nepalese parliamentary government, which according to the TKB statistics was the target of 39 percent of their attacks. This group frequently used kidnapping and several times had kidnapped an entire school or village and forced hundreds to undergo Maoist indoctrination and reeducation.

Taking the scoring of all two hundred events into account, recent terrorist media oriented activity was seen most in terrorist groups with environmental or political aims who were based in Western countries. Low media oriented activity was associated with terrorist groups with communist political or religious goals based in non-Western countries. The single most important factor regarding any group's individual media orientation scale score was their base of operation. Scale scores differed significantly by theater of action. They were highest for European groups; lowest for South America, India, and Pakistan groups. This raises the possibility that media oriented terrorism was determined by ready access to Western media as much as by terrorist goals.

Which of the twelve factors utilized herein were best at predicting media orientation scores? This question was first examined by calculating the Pearson's *r* for each of the two hundred event's final score with each individual indicator. Reported in Table 4 are the results in rank order from strongest to weakest correlation.

As can be seen, Western victims and sites were the strongest correlates of an event's final media orientation score, followed by a set of media interactive factors (statements, claims, pre-event announcements) and symbolic event value. Less important, but still significantly related to an event's final score, were levels of fatalities and injuries, brutality, and availability of images of events as well as the deeming of an event as targeted at a distant audience. High profile victims or facilities emerged as the sole item not significantly related to the media orientation final score. These correlation results suggested that media orientation was less linked to event harm and more linked to event location and target.

This interpretation was supported by an examination of the Cronbach's alpha associated with the measures. As the twelve indices of media orientation tapped into differing dimensions of media orientation (target selection, efforts to involve the media, characteristics of the event), it was not surprising that the items did not

Table 4
Pearson's *r* between media orientation score and media orientation indicators (n = 200)

Scale item	R	Sig.
U.S. or Western victim or facility	.666	.000
Event location Western site	.611	.000
Statement to media	.554	.000
Group claim	.501	.000
Symbolic value	.342	.000
Media pre-informed	.309	.000
Fatalities (5+) or injuries (10+)	.219	.002
Distant audience	.199	.005
Images to media	.177	.012
Brutal or unique	.146	.039
High profile victim or facility	.122	.086

produce a strong uni-dimensional alpha score. For all twelve items, an alpha of only .406 was obtained. Higher alpha scores were obtained by deleting factors such as number of fatalities or injuries, brutal or unique nature, high profile victims, symbolic attack, and group claims. The remaining items provided a moderate alpha score of .629. Together, the correlations and Cronbach's alpha values suggested that the twelve items measured differing elements of media orientation and that certain terrorist event characteristics reflected a higher degree of media orientation than others. This possibility was further explored via an exploratory factor analysis.

Table 5 reflects that five significant components emerged from a factor analysis and collectively explained about two-thirds of the variance in media orientation scores. The first component comprised of two items, *U.S. or Western victim or facility* and *Western event location*, was labeled “Western target or site” and explained about one-fifth of the total variance. The second component, comprised of *statements to the media* and *event claimed by group*, contributed an additional 14 percent of explanatory power. The presence of *group claims* also loaded strongly on the third component, but with a negative sign. Its absence, together with the item *distant audience*, made up the third component named for its positively loading factor, “distant audience,” statistically explained another 11 percent of the variance. The fourth component, “high profile target and images,” incorporated the two respective items and explained an additional 11 percent of variance. Due to the low correlation of high profile targets reported in Table 4, it is likely that providing images to the media was the more important factor characteristic. Lastly, the fifth component, termed “brutal or unique,” was made up of only one item. It explained 9 percent of the variance. Applying the common cut-off criteria of .5, three of the twelve original items did not load on any component factor, *media pre-informed*, *symbolic attack*, or *fatalities greater than five or injuries greater than ten*. (The individual item loadings are provided in Appendix C.)

Collectively, the correlation analysis, Cronbach's alpha reliability analysis, and exploratory factor analysis all pointed to media orientation as a multifaceted concept. Target and victim location emerged as the best indicators of an elevated media orientation for an individual event. Conversely and perhaps surprisingly given their inherent news value, fatalities and injuries and brutal or unique events emerged as indicators of a lesser degree of media orientation. Lastly, an examination of the twenty average terrorist group scores also supported the above interpretation. The Pearson correlation between a group's average media orientation score and a Western focus (percent Western targets) equaled .822 ($p < .000$). Conversely, average number of injured (Pearson $r = -.175$, $p = .461$) and average number of total fatalities (Pearson $r = -.237$, $p = .314$) were insignificantly correlated to a group's score. These results supported the contention that target selection was the best single indicator of a high degree of media orientation, while injuries and fatalities were serendipitous to a media orientation.

Collapsing the twenty selected groups into their subcategory types, the media oriented rank order by terrorist group type is provided in Table 6. The observed rank order was logical for a valid media oriented terrorism scale. As hypothesized, environment and anti-globalization groups scored highest; communist and religious groups scored lowest.

Table 5
Principal component factor analysis significant components total variance explained

Component	Extraction sums of squared loadings		
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %
1. Western target or site	2.273	20.665	20.665
2. Media claim or statement	1.509	13.717	34.382
3. Distant audience	1.253	11.395	45.778
4. High profile and images	1.191	10.825	56.603
5. Brutal or unique	1.017	9.242	65.845

Table 6
Media oriented terrorism scores by terrorist category

Type	Average	Range	Variability
Environmental (2)	3.50	3.7-3.3	0.4
Anti-globalization (2)	2.15	2.9-1.4	1.5
al-Qaeda (5)	1.68	2.5-0.8	1.7
Nationalist/separatist (3)	1.67	2.6-0.4	2.2
Religious (5)	1.16	2.1-0.9	1.2
Communist (3)	1.10	3.1-0.1	3.0

The environmental groups had both the highest media oriented score range and average and displayed the least inter-event variation, while the low scoring communist groups had both the lowest scale averages and greatest inter-event variability. The goals of the top two scoring types of terrorist groups (environmental and anti-globalization) involved worldwide perspectives—saving the global environment and stopping international corporate growth—logically goals most in need of media attention. In contrast, the goals of the lowest scoring types of terrorist groups (religious and communist)—to establish either a new local religious or communist style government—did not need to attract a worldwide audience and were less in need of media attention.

Discussion

Overall, the twelve indicators selected to conceptualize media orientation performed adequately. Of the four conceptual areas described in Fig. 2, indicators related to the involvement of journalists (informing media, providing statements or interview, posting or distributing images, and self-identifying the terrorist group) collectively did well in differentiating media oriented from non-media oriented events. The factors related to terrorist targets (from a Western country, high profile status, attack occurs within a Western country, and symbolic value) also discriminated media orientation. Regarding the third conceptual area, the terrorist event, however, two of the four factors required in some cases that terrorist's ‘intent’ be inferred. Thus, while the assessment of whether an event was nonmonetary can normally be determined by the actions and demands of the terrorists and the number of fatalities and injuries readily quantified, whether a terrorist event was deemed to be aimed at a distant audience or was a unique or brutal act was, at least sometimes, arbitrarily determined. It is possible that a brutal terrorist act was not intended to be brutal and that an event that reaches a distant audience was not designed to do so. The subjective nature of these assessments likely explains the inconsistent performance of these media orientation indicators. A larger sample of events needs to be scored by multiple coders to determine how reliable these factors can be evaluated and perform.

Irrespective of determining the nuances of media orientation, the establishment of an approach to quantify media orientation per terrorist event and terrorist group has been demonstrated. With that research capability in hand; a number of research questions can be subsequently empirically addressed. First, long-term trends in media oriented terrorism needs to be studied and understood. Raphael Perl wrote in 1997 that anonymous terrorism where no one claims responsibility and no demands are made was on the rise. The results of this study were contrary to this assessment. Evidence in the TKB data base showed that unclaimed acts by terrorists were not increasing (they did, however, make up the majority of terrorist acts—about three of four acts were unclaimed and unattributed),¹³ but attacks against journalists and media which nearly guarantees media coverage have increased. Further supporting the idea that media oriented terrorist events were on the rise, Perl noted a trend toward more violent terrorist acts and an upward trend toward attacks on media personnel and institutions—a trend that dipped after his 1997 comment, but had increased in recent years.¹⁴

Second, as this examination of media orientation reflected, anonymous terrorism could have many media oriented features without a formal claim by a terrorist group. Thus, if a terrorist group's publicity goals were to get media attention and intimidate a targeted society, there would be no need to claim an attack, make statements, or give interviews. Media contacts might also be avoided due to fear that they provide clues to security forces. In some political environments, targets and media know the likely identity of terrorists without the need for claims and interviews. It is possible that events that have the additional media orientation indicators of media contacts and formal group claims are substantively different in nature than those without such factors. Whether this is the case and the relationship of direct media contacts to a group's media orientation needs to be explored.

An additional unaddressed research area involves the relationship of the individual media oriented characteristics to actual media coverage—how common are failed media oriented terrorist events and what proportion of terrorist events which have many of the twelve media oriented characteristics received little coverage? Conversely, how common are serendipitous media attracting terrorist events and what sorts of non-media oriented attacks receive massive coverage are also unexplored research issues. A related question is besides the pursuit of media attention, what structural characteristics define media oriented terrorist groups and distinguishes high media orientation from low media group orientation?

Third, a longitudinal analysis examining how terrorist have historically used the media is needed (Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Ross, 2007). Within this longitudinal analysis, questions regarding the distribution of media oriented terrorist events, including how the level of media orientation and media differ by era and region and what happens after media attention is gained need examination. For example, does the presence of increased media coverage trigger a shift to a lower media orientation by a terrorist group for a span of time or does media attention set off a competition between terrorist groups for more media attention and higher media oriented activity?

An emerging last important research question involves the role of the Internet and other new media for contemporary media oriented terrorist activity. To what extent are terrorists today employing old versus new media outlets? A quantitative study of the use of print and

television broadcast outlets (old media) versus the use of Web-based outlets and interactive technologies (new media), such as Web postings of statements, claims, or demands; images of victims or events; video postings and streaming video; or encrypted messages or instructions is an obvious deficiency in the research (Ross, 2007). Virtual organizations have emerged in the business world and have encouraged the diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 2003) and today have counterparts in the terrorist world (Taylor, Caeti, Loper, & Fritsch, 2006). The basic issue is whether the original generalist media oriented terrorist has evolved into a Web-oriented specialist (Bailey & Grimala, 2006). Evidence of such a process is suggested in the hundreds of terrorist and military attack images and videos readily available on the Internet.¹⁵ Weimann (2004) estimated that terrorist organizations increased their presence on the Internet from twelve to over four thousand sites in the span of seven years and noted that contemporary terrorist groups use the Internet for many purposes: psychological warfare, disseminate threats and fear; disperse publicity and propaganda, fund raising, communication, recruitment and mobilization of support—all benefits previously seen as accruing from traditional news media coverage.

Provided with a means of quantifying media orientation, the above research questions can hopefully be pursued via empirical studies. As shown in this effort, the empirical analysis of the media orientation of terrorist events can be revealing. Despite the common newsworthiness of death and injury, for example, groups demonstrated the ability to pursue media attention without physical harm to victims. Also some well-known, more established terrorist groups with high Western profiles such as Hamas and Hezbollah did not aggressively pursue the media during this study's time frame. Furthermore, in terms of its media orientation, where a terrorist group operated appeared to be more important than where it ideologically stood as the single best predictor of a group's level of media orientation. In conclusion, media oriented terrorism has been and appears likely to be an increasingly substantial element of terrorism. As better knowledge of their trends and character would assist media policy decisions and coverage recommendations, a sound empirical examination of their history, nature, and future is warranted. A means of measuring media oriented terrorism as explicated will aid such an examination.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2009.06.011.

Notes

1. For example, between 66 and 73 A.D., two Jewish groups, the Sicarii and the Zealots, were among the first to use terrorism as a strategy (Burgess, 2003; Martin, 2006; Poland, 2005). Another religious linked terrorist organization was the Order of the Assassins, which existed from the eleventh to the thirteenth century in Persia. These Shia Muslims ingested drugs before publicly stabbing their victims for failure to adhere to strict Islamic practices. The term "assassin" is derived from the Arabic "hashashin" or "hashish eater" from this group (Martin, 2006). A third example is the religious terrorist group, the "Thuggees," based in India. These terrorists strangled victims with a silk scarf or noose as a sacrifice to Kali, the Hindu goddess of destruction (Poland, 2005).

2. Schmid and de Graaf (1982) noted that in the late nineteenth century, two new phenomena emerged: the mass press and modern insurgent terrorism. Both owed much of their existence to recent technological developments. For anarchist terrorism it was dynamite, discovered in 1866. For the media it was the rotary press, introduced in 1848 and perfected in 1891. The two inventions soon started to interact. Schmid (1989) argued that changes in communication technology since the 1970s favored the emergence of media oriented terrorism.

3. "Modern terror began with the slogan 'Propaganda of the deed' advocated in the declaration of the delegates of the Italian Federation of the Anarchist International of 3 December 1876" (Iviansky, 1977, p. 45; see also Fleming, 1980).

4. Midlarsky et al. (1980) point out the increase in the copying of terrorist tactics following the 1968 COMSAT satellite established the news media capability of international live coverage. Schmid and de Graaf (1982; see also Martin, 2006) list




Fig. 3. Targets of terrorist attacks by year, 1968 to 2006 - international incidents. (Source: Terrorism Knowledge Base).

the benefits of media coverage for terrorists groups to include communication of fear messages to massive audiences, gaining converts and attracting new members, winning favorable public perceptions and gaining public status, misleading opponents by spreading false information, advertising terrorist movements and causes, pressuring government concessions, discrediting victims and regimes by disseminating “confessions,” announcing further actions, inciting the public against the government, and boosting morale. In addition, media coverage of terrorist attacks contributes to other groups imitating or modeling successful acts based on a combination of factors. First, seldom are the perpetrators of terrorist acts ever punished. Second, the terrorist act is often portrayed as justified. The extraordinary coverage of terrorist incidents encourages identification with the group by others. The terrorist group is often portrayed as having great strength, power, and support. The act of violence is dramatized within an infotainment format, where a significant amount of time is spent photographing victims, scenes of violence, and interviewing terrorists (Poland, 2005).

5. The Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) was developed and is maintained by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), a nonprofit research institute established after the bombing of Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19, 1995.

6. *TKB terrorism*: for the purposes of this data base, terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. *International terrorism*: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel, or equipment. *Domestic terrorism*: incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target.

7. For example, new terrorist groups may be more media oriented as they strive to establish themselves or long established terrorist groups may be more media oriented because they have developed the infrastructure and media sophistication to successfully carry out media oriented events.

8. Benchmark terrorist events media orientation scores and a comparison set of events with scores of 0 on the media orientation measure are provided in Appendix D. Unclaimed bombings were the most common element for events scored 0.

9. For example, Martin (2006) described Hezbollah as follows:

Hezbollah has long engaged in media-oriented political violence. In the aftermath of its attacks, Hezbollah leaders and supporters engaged in public relations campaigns. Press releases were issued and interviews granted. Statements were made to the world press...Hezbollah intentionally packaged its strikes as representing heroic resistance against inveterate evil and exploitation. It produced audio, photographic, and video images of its resistance for distribution to the press...Some of Hezbollah's attack were videotaped and sent to the media—with images of dead Israeli soldiers and stalwart Hezbollah attackers. Young Hezbollah suicide bombers recorded videotaped messages prior to their attacks. These tapes were widely distributed, and the suicidal fighters were cast as martyrs in a righteous cause...Hezbollah continues to maintain an extensive media and public relation operation and has periodically posted a Web site. When active, the web site contains political statements, reports from the ‘front,’ audio links, video links, photographs, and email links. (p. 390)

10. Representing a middle of the pack group, Ansar al-Sunnah (or Followers of the Tradition) had targeted the new Iraqi government, police, military, banks, mosques, and infrastructure workers that support rebuilding efforts in Iraq. According to the classification of their attacks in the TKB, Ansar al-Sunnah had three main targets: other (infrastructure targets in Iraq) 31 percent, police 27 percent, and government 25 percent. Their sampled attacks included no Western targets, however, they frequently took credit for their attacks and had videotaped several of their kidnapped victims being beheaded or killed. They therefore scored a mid-range 1.6 on the media oriented measure.

11. Abu Sayyaf, which is Arabic for “Bearer of the Sword,” operated from the Philippines. This group targeted civilians in over 40 percent of their attacks per the TKB data and frequently resorted to mass kidnapping as a source for their income. Their kidnapping of twenty Christian missionaries in May 2001 and the subsequent beheadings and murders of several hostages over the next months caught the attention of the world press.

12. Hezbollah is a well known Islamic terrorist group launched in 1982. They are a collection of various Shia groups and are based in Lebanon. Similar to Al-Fatah, they committed many of their attacks against Israel. They split their targets evenly between diplomatic, military, and maritime targets in the TKB data.

13. The TKB data base estimated the annual average percentage of unattributed and unclaimed terrorist attacks from 1999 through 2005 at 72.9 within a narrow range of 67.2 to 77.6 percent.

14. The TKB data base did not consistently include acts committed in the United States until 1998, so only international non-U.S. events were examined for long-term trends. As shown in Fig. 3, attacks against military targets peaked in the 1980s. Telecommunication targets had not increased, nor had they become a common target. To the extent that attacks against journalists and the media reflect media oriented terrorism, following a jump in 1997 and subsequent decline, such attacks did display a recent near-term increase suggesting that media oriented terrorism had become more common since 2003.

15. In a February 5, 2001 *USA Today* article (Kelley, 2001), a brief list of Middle Eastern terrorists use of the Internet was provided:

- Wadhi El Hage, one of the suspects in the 1998 bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, sent encrypted e-mails under various names, including “Norman” and “Abdus Sabbur,” to “associates in al Qaida,” according to the October 25, 1998 U.S. indictment against him.
- Khalil Deek, an alleged terrorist arrested in Pakistan in 1999, used encrypted computer files to plot bombings in Jordan at the turn of the millennium. U.S. officials say. Authorities found Deek's computer at his Peshawar, Pakistan home and turned it over to the U.S. National Security Agency. Mathematicians, using supercomputers, decoded the files, enabling the FBI to foil the plan.
- Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, used encrypted files to hide details of a plot to destroy eleven U.S. airliners. Philippines officials found the computer in Yousef's Manila apartment in 1995. U.S. officials broke the encryption foiling the plot.

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