

International Criminal Justice Review

<http://icj.sagepub.com/>

A Longitudinal Analysis of Public Satisfaction with the Police in the Volgograd Region of Russia 1998 —2005

K. Michael Reynolds, Olga B. Semukhina and Nicolai N. Demidov

International Criminal Justice Review 2008 18: 158

DOI: 10.1177/1057567708318484

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://icj.sagepub.com/content/18/2/158>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:

[Georgia State University, College of Health and Human Sciences](#)

Additional services and information for *International Criminal Justice Review* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://icj.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://icj.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations: <http://icj.sagepub.com/content/18/2/158.refs.html>

>> [Version of Record](#) - Jul 7, 2008

[What is This?](#)

A Longitudinal Analysis of Public Satisfaction with the Police in the Volgograd Region of Russia

1998–2005

K. Michael Reynolds

Olga B. Semukhina

Nicolai N. Demidov

Volgograd Law Academy, Russia

University of Central Florida, Orlando

This study examines public satisfaction with police in a region of Russia and empirically confirms that dissatisfaction remains high and pervasive in the region. A brief historical summary is included that highlights the development of the Soviet police. The literature review includes a discussion of both Russian and English studies that have identified various factors related to public satisfaction with police. This study examines raw longitudinal citizen survey data ($N = 4,000$) collected annually from 1998–2005 and focuses on citizen trust of criminal justice institutions and fear of crime as explanatory variables. An explanatory empirical model is developed to test whether low levels of public satisfaction with police in Russia can be attributed to the distrust of criminal justice institutions and fear of crime. The model is grounded in the motive-based theory of institutional trust. The findings of the study provide empirical evidence that criminal justice institutional trust is a major explanatory factor regarding public police satisfaction in Russia.

Keywords: *police corruption; police satisfaction; public satisfaction with police; Russian Federation; Russian policing*

Introduction

Numerous studies have shown that public satisfaction with the police and other criminal justice institutions in Russia is problematic. Most of the 30 or so studies that address this problem are in Russian and primarily descriptive (LEV DADA, 2004; ROMIR, 2005a; WCIOM, 2001; Zvekić, 1996). About 10 of the studies published in Russia were by independent researchers who were not employed by the government and contain some level of analysis (Gryaznova, 2006; Gudkov, 2000; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; Gudkov et al., 2004; ZIRCON, 2001). Less than a dozen studies about public satisfaction with the police in Russia have been published in English (Beck & Lee, 2002; Beck & Robertson, 2003; Davis et al., 2004; Glinskiy, 2000; Robertson, 2005). Additionally, most of the studies were cross-sectional and used divergent measurement concepts and variables.

The purpose of this study is to analyze and report the results of an eight-year, longitudinal citizen survey (1998–2005) that used consistent survey items about public satisfaction with

the police and criminal justice system. The Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs¹ mandated the survey, and it was conducted by faculty of the Volgograd Law Academy (VLA) in Volgograd, Russia. The VLA is one of several nationally designated research centers. While the survey instrument has limitations, it does provide the ability to track citizen attitude trends as well as establish a baseline to evaluate a series of police and criminal justice reforms implemented in Russia beginning in 1991. The results of this type are rarely published in Russian journals since access to the raw data is restricted to the MVD research centers (Bezaev, 1999; Cherkasov, 2006; Tumentsev, 2002). Our review of the literature did not find any MVD research center study results regarding public satisfaction with police published in English.

This study includes a brief historical review of the major events that have shaped policing and the criminal justice system in contemporary Russia. The USSR influence was a major factor in the current policies and operations of criminal justice institutions in Russia. Present-day conditions throughout Russia have been shaped by the USSR period, its tumultuous collapse on December 8, 1991, along with democratization reforms and the associated market-based economy transition. These major disruptive events have contextual relevance regarding public satisfaction with the police (Beck & Robertson, 2005; Bel'skyi, 2004; Fastov, 2005).

This study investigates potential associations between citizens' fear of crime, trust of the major Russian criminal justice institutions, and public satisfaction with police. An investigation of these relationships may contribute to an enhanced understanding of the persistent low rates of public satisfaction with the Russian police.

The study incorporates the motive-based theory of institutional trust developed by Tyler and Huo (2002) as an analytical framework. The motive-based theory asserts that citizens' trust of an institution depends on whether they believe their motives and best interests are being shared and protected by the institution (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Therefore, based on the motive-based theory of trust, as related to public-police relationships, criminal justice institutional trust would play a major role in shaping subsequent public attitudes about police satisfaction. It follows that public trust of the criminal justice institutions should be included as a potential factor in an analysis related to public satisfaction with police.

The study's results support a conclusion that despite numerous efforts of the Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs (MVD) to improve public satisfaction with police, little change occurred during the eight-year study period. Public satisfaction with police remained poor. The findings also show that fluctuations in crime rates and police performance regarding solved cases during the study period had little observed association with public-police satisfaction. The study offers empirical evidence that some variation within public satisfaction with the Russian police can be explained by a pervasive public distrust of the major criminal justice institutions.

Historical Factors Related to Public Satisfaction with the Police in Contemporary Russia

To more fully understand current public satisfaction with the Russian police, a brief historical overview is provided. This overview develops the contextual framework necessary to fully interpret this study's analyses of recent empirical survey data related to public satisfaction with the police. The overview is not intended to be comprehensive and entail the

entire pre- and post-USSR periods but, instead, aims to provide a historical setting related to public satisfaction with the police.

Since its creation in 1917, the Soviet police had a special relationship with Russian society. Established by the Resolution of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviet Councils on November 7, 1917, the Soviet police were intended to represent and defend the new ruling class that consisted of peasants and workers (Fastov, 2005). Moreover, it was organized to filter out the “ideologically” weak individuals who would be unsuitable for the new regime and then physically remove them from society by exile, imprisonment, or death (Gryaznova, 2006).

The first resolution of the newly created police ministry, known as the NKVD,² prescribed that every local Soviet Council of Workers and Soldiers should create a police department from available and ideologically solid workers, peasants, and soldiers. The Instruction “About the Organization of Workers and Peasants Police,” dated October 12, 1918, in Article 18 directly stated that only individuals supporting the Soviet ideology could be granted a membership in the Soviet police (Instruction “About the Organization of Workers and Peasants Police,” 1918). Most historians agree that the Soviet police organization during the period from 1917 to 1920 was not a governmental institution at all. Instead, it was a self-organized public militia consisting of former factory workers and peasants who united to protect the new and favorably accepted regime of Soviet Councils (Bel’skyi, 2004). Because of its nature, from 1917 to 1920, the Soviet police received unconditional support from the classes it was representing and vigorous resistance from the groups whose rights and social positions were seriously damaged by the new Soviet regime (Fastov, 2005).

The “new economic policy”³ conducted by the Soviet government between 1920 and 1930 created a strong economic foundation for the new Soviet police. The NKVD received its own budget, buildings, uniforms, and established local structures in every region of the Soviet Union (Fastov, 2005).

During the decade from 1930 to 1940, a totalitarian regime emerged and transformed the nature of public-police relations in Soviet Russia. The police were no longer viewed by the public as a self-organized protection group. Instead, the police became a repressive mechanism of the Soviet state. Agents of the police were participating in massive arrests, torture, and exiling citizens as dictated by Stalin’s regime. During this period, the public feared and respected the police agency’s power (Bel’skyi, 2004).

Khrushchev introduced an era of liberalization after Stalin’s death in 1953. These measures had an impact on public-police relationships in Soviet Russia. To avoid the image of the police as a closed organization with the primary purpose of protecting state and ruling party interests, the Soviet government gave the public limited access to the local police structures responsible for protecting the public order. This was accomplished in 1959 by the creation of an organization known as Teams of Police Volunteers (Fastov, 2005).

The Teams of Police Volunteers were self-organized groups of nonprofessionals who were charged with the protection of public order in a given neighborhood, and they were considered a structural part of the Soviet police. The Council of Ministers adopted the Resolution for the Teams of Police Volunteers on March 2, 1959, and by 1962, 130,000 teams were in place (Fastov, 2005). Although there is no empirical evidence that suggests that the Teams of Police Volunteers improved public-police relationships in Soviet Russia, Russian historians recorded their existence, and it appeared as an attempt to improve public satisfaction with the police (Bel’skyi, 2004; Fastov, 2005).

From about 1960 through the 1970s is usually considered one of the most successful periods for public-police relationships in Soviet Russia. With low crime rates in the country and a limited number of political repressions, the Soviet police were generally viewed in a positive manner by the public (Efremova, 1990). Of course, this did not overshadow the fact that most policemen were still considered to be representatives of the state and the Communist Party. The police were perceived to favor ruling class interests and communist ideology more so than needs of the average citizen (Gryaznova, 2006; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006).

During the 1970s, two scientific research centers, the Institute of Strengthening the Legality and Legal Order of State Attorney Office and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of MVD USSR, began their first massive examination of public perception toward the police, the courts, and other criminal justice institutions (Borisov & Kudryavtsev, 1993). However, the results of the studies were kept secret and were not released to the public or the lower-level leadership in the criminal justice agencies (Vortontsov, 1997). At an aggregated level, these findings were presented to the Attorney General and Minister of Interior Affairs. Some of the findings were included in the Annual Recommendations on the Improvement of Soviet Legality (Efremova et al., 1989). This document consisted of aggregated research presented to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers by the leadership of all law enforcement agencies. It outlined the main problems concerning the implementation of criminal law and provided recommendations for improving law and order in the USSR (Efremova, 1990).

The first open-source information about public satisfaction with criminal justice institutions in Soviet Russia was released in the late 1980s. The release was a result of the major Gorbachev reform initiatives. The information was primarily report excerpts from two state-sponsored research centers: the Institute of Strengthening the Legality and Legal Order of State Attorney Office and the All-Russian Scientific Institute of MVD USSR. The results of these government studies showed that public satisfaction pertaining to the criminal justice system was seriously deteriorating during the Soviet era of the late 1980s.

The State Attorney Office research reported that fear of crime increased by a factor of four between 1989 and 1990, compared with a similar measurement covering the period of 1979 to 1986 (Efremova, 1990). An MVD study reported that 74% of respondents surveyed between 1988 and 1989 stated they were fearful of crime (Krivel'skaya, 1990). Only 6% to 8% of all respondents reported satisfaction with the criminal justice institutions in 1986, and 18% reported that they did not have enough information to form an opinion (Efremova, 1990). In a study conducted by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of MVD USSR⁴ in 1990, only 2.9% of citizen respondents reported being satisfied with the police, and 61.5% believed that they were doing a poor job (Krivel'skaya, 1990).

The new Russian democratized state created after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed, for the first time, nongovernmental agencies to measure public satisfaction with the police, related criminal justice system elements, and authorized the results released to the public. The results of studies conducted by nongovernmental entities were even less encouraging than those previously conducted by government research agencies. In 1989, 16% of all respondents believed that the police situation had improved over the last five years, yet in 1990 citizen satisfaction with the police declined by 7% (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006). Only 3% of the study population had positive attitudes about the Russian police in 1990 (Morn & Sergevnin, 1994).

The police, courts, central intelligence agency, and the prosecutor's office all experienced a serious public trust problem. In 1993, these institutions were ranked in the top five of the most distrusted government agencies (Gudkov, 2000). The two least trusted agencies included the Russian Parliament and various units of the executive branch. From 1988 to 1993, it was found that citizens reporting their fear of crime increased threefold from 26% to 77% (Gudkov, 2000). In 1993, 64% of all respondents were disturbed by the rapidly growing crime rates (Glinskiy, 2000).

These findings were not surprising, considering conditions in the new Russian state during the early 1990s. The crime rates increased from 989 registered crimes per 100,000 residents in 1985 to 1,463 registered crimes per 100,000 residents in 1991. This represented an increase of more than 30% in a six-year period (Glinskiy, 2000). At the same time, the collapse of the planned economy created a serious disorganization of the new economy, which dramatically changed the socioeconomic status of the average policeman.

Police officer salaries plummeted by 200% between 1985 and 1989. These salary payments were often delayed by months, while the level of inflation and the concurrent bank crisis made the situation even worse (Kolennikova, 2006). As a result, police officers moved quickly from a high social status to one of the lowest in Russian society (Galeotti, 1993). The absence of adequate resources, training, and increasing crime rates combined to produce extremely poor performance by the Russian police in the early 1990s. Even the official statistics of the MVD reflected that more than two thirds of all registered crimes in Russia from 1989 to 1995 remained unsolved.⁵ During the same period, unsolved registered felony rates reached 79% (Fastov, 2005).

A drastic shift in social ideology, combined with other social change factors, had a devastating impact on the Russian police. Created in 1917 to protect the communist ideology, the Russian police of the early 1990s found themselves in a challenging ideological vacuum. The new market-driven society provided very little ideological directions to anyone, including the police. This process, known as the "deideologization" of the Russian police, led to a significant deterioration of police morale and subsequently caused many old-cadre policemen to leave their jobs (Kolennikova, 2006).

New police officers were lacking in professionalism, training, and experience, but were ready to make "adjustments" to the new economic conditions. By 1992, 39% of all Russian police officers in the Ural region had less than five years of experience. These "adjustments" very often included abuse of power, misconduct, or simply participating in organized criminal activity. By the late 1990s, the abuse of power by Russian police, and other criminal justice agencies was so entrenched that many researchers spoke about the entire police system being mired in an institutional crisis (Fastov, 2005; Pustintsev, 2000; Rutkevitch, 1998; Savchenko, 1997; Vorob'ev, 1992).

Nevertheless, the Russian government reacted slowly to the myriad of problems. The first legal reform of the Russian police system was known as the Federal Police Act of 1991. This act declared that "state interest" was the main priority of the newly created Russian police (Uildriks & Reenen, 2003). In 1992, the Ministry of Interior Affairs finally admitted that public satisfaction with the Russian police had seriously declined over the last several years. The acknowledgement was published in the Decree of MVD #295, adopted on August 22, 1992 (MVD, 1992). For the first time in the history of the Russian police, Decree #295 required studies about public satisfaction with the police and other criminal justice agencies.

Networks of research centers were created to conduct the studies throughout the country. On June 4, 1997, the MVD adopted a new Decree (#337) that supplemented Decree #295. The new policy required that in addition to conducting surveys about public satisfaction with the Russian criminal justice system, the results were to be published in bulletins with open public access (MVD, 1997).⁶ To continue improving the public image of Russian police, the MVD adopted Decree #977 on December 6, 1999. This decree required the production of "informational propaganda" that would produce a positive public image of the police. It also mandated this action as the number one priority of the regional MVD offices. The decree instructed all regional offices to continue working with mass media institutions to improve public opinion about the police (MVD, 1999).

On November 12, 2001, Decree #319 created a federal program for monitoring adverse publicity about police and other criminal justice agencies. It established a list of possible publication types that required monitoring adverse content reported to the central MVD office in Moscow. This was part of the continued efforts to improve public satisfaction with the Russian police (MVD, 2001).

On September 5, 2005, Decree #718 was adopted to reform police interaction with the mass media. In the decree, the MVD admitted the public-police image was still quite troubling, and the MVD should use additional resources to create an objective public understanding of police goals and objectives while informing the public about its current and future activities (MVD, 2005a).

Finally, one of the most remarkable documents that reflected significant changes in MVD policy regarding public opinion was Decree #650 of August 5, 2005 (MVD, 2005b). This document instructed all regional MVD offices that public opinion poll results conducted by the network of research centers should not only be published and analyzed by the researchers but should also become criteria to measure performance of each regional office. Previous evaluation criteria for the Soviet and Russian police included only statistical data such as crime rates or unsolved crimes. The inclusion of public satisfaction with the police as a performance criterion indicated a small, yet important, attempt to improve public satisfaction with the police in Russia.

This brief historical overview indicates that the development of a positive public-police relationship in the Soviet Union, and modern Russia, has been difficult. Some modern societies that have achieved relatively high levels of police professionalism and integrity view the present-day criminal justice system reforms in Russia as backward, corrupt, and nonprogressive. However, the historical context is helpful to more fully appreciate and interpret the current trends related to public satisfaction with police.

Because the police institution was created and functioned as designed to protect the rights and ideology of the ruling class and not the ordinary citizens, the transition has been especially problematic. The Soviet police model, combined with the drastic political and economic changes of the early 1990s, has served to erode public trust and support. These circumstances and events have created a major problem for the entire criminal justice system. In the next section, the extant literature related to current public satisfaction with the police is discussed. The discussion underscores the contribution of our study toward an improved understanding of contemporary public satisfaction with the Russian police.

Literature Review and Research Problem

Over the past 15 years, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, research about Russian police satisfaction and fear of crime has appeared in English publications (Beck & Robertson, 2003, 2005; Butler, 2003; Frederick, 1993; Galeotti, 1993; Miller, 1999; Morn & Sergevnin, 1994; Morozov & Sergevnin, 1996; Pustintsev, 2000; Timoshenko, 1997; Yelin, 2001). More than 20 research reports were found with topics ranging from perceptions about police corruption in Russia to police reform and education (Beck & Lee, 2002; Mawby, 1999). While a number of these articles reported about citizens' dissatisfaction with the police and related misconduct, only a few studies offered explanations for their attitudes (Davis et al., 2004; Glinskiy, 2000; Johnson & Paromchik, 2002; Robertson, 2005).

The post-USSR Russian literature contains numerous studies about public satisfaction with the Russian police. With the development of free speech and less censorship in Russia, numerous reports of police dissatisfaction have appeared in the literature (Andreev, 2005; Borisov & Kudryavtsev, 1993; Nevirko et al., 2006; Shafigullin, 1995; Tarasova, 2004; Vorontsov, 1997). The empirical studies investigating public dissatisfaction with police in Russia through citizen surveys, secondary data analysis, and qualitative data contain little interpretative analyses of the pervasive negative public attitudes (Budanov & Krivel'skaya, 1994; Kalashnikov, 1996; Kukushkin, 1996; Kuzminskiy et al., 1994; Polegaev, 1997; Rebrii, 1995).

Descriptive Reports About Public Satisfaction With Russian Police

There are several methodological approaches in the literature related to the problem of police dissatisfaction in Russia. The first group of studies consisted of numerous descriptive reports by the following research organizations: ROMIR, FOM, WCIOM, and LEVADA.⁷ There were also studies by researchers that were not government agents. FOM (2005), an independent sociological research group, reported that 38% of the respondents perceived police work as "really bad,"⁸ compared with 47% in 2002. LEVADA (2004) found that only 10% of Russians were satisfied with police performance. The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) reported that in 1992, 50.1% of respondents believed that police do not do a good job, and in the same year, Zvekic (1996) found that only 7.5% reported that police do a good job. In 1996, according to the ICVS, the level of public satisfaction with police increased to 10.2% (ICVS, 1996). Clearly, these various studies have demonstrated that public satisfaction with police has not improved despite some major federal level policy initiatives. Even though the studies varied by sample size, time frame, and survey participant selection methodology, the results were similar.

While these studies are important and serve to alert the public and government officials about the low levels of public-police satisfaction, little understanding was gained about the underlying reasons that contribute to the pervasive public dissatisfaction with the Russian police.

Attempts to Explain Russian Police Dissatisfaction

A second group of studies did attempt to determine the reasons for public dissatisfaction with police by presenting this direct question to the respondent: "What is wrong

with Russian police?" The answers ranged from complaints that police receive poor legal education and training to low salaries and insufficient budgets (Dzuev et al., 2005; Gryaznova, 2006; Gudkov et al., 2004). However, the most common answer was related to some kind of misconduct and/or abuse of police power that was personally witnessed by the respondent or from the experience of others. For example, a 2005 study conducted in Ossetiya revealed that 25% of all respondents attributed police dissatisfaction to high levels of police corruption in the region (Dzuev et al., 2005). Moscow residents surveyed in October of 2005 also reported corruption (41% of respondents) as the number one reason for police dissatisfaction (Gryaznova, 2006). In a study conducted by the LEVADA center in 2002, corruption and negligence were the top reasons for dissatisfaction with Russian police. In their national survey, 32% of residents considered corruption and negligence the number one problems with police work (Gudkov et al., 2004).

An analysis of these studies indicated that while the findings are important, there are confounding issues with the methodologies. By asking directly about the causes of public-police dissatisfaction, the researchers often elicited biased responses that did not measure other problems that influence police performance. These problems include poor funding, citizens' unwillingness to obey the law, and the willingness of citizenry to offer bribes. The bias results from the tendency of citizens to shift the responsibility for societal problems entirely to the police. Andreev (2005) found that only 12% of respondents agreed that the public is also responsible for establishing constructive dialogue and communication with the police. Direct responses to questions about police were also contaminated from the mass media's pervasive negative police stereotyping.

The Mass Media's Influence on Citizen Attitudes

The mass media coverage and other sources of information that shape public opinion was a major focus of the third group of studies about public-police dissatisfaction. These studies asked respondents to report their sources of information about police such as personal contact, mass media coverage, third-party experiences, and others (Bondarenko, 2006a, 2006b; Komlev et al., 1997; Krivel'skaya, 1990; Tumentsev, 2002). The low levels of public satisfaction with police were usually attributed to the high levels of mass media exposure and negative personal experiences with police. Negative publicity is often blamed in these studies for public dissatisfaction with the police. Some social groups (such as younger, urban, and educated respondents) were shown to be more influenced by the media coverage than personal experience (Bondarenko, 2006a; FOM, 2005).

A content analysis of media coverage about topics of policing showed that only one third of all news content portrayed policemen and their work in a positive manner (Rebrii, 1995). As a result, researchers found that public opinion about police contained numerous stereotypes. These stereotypes are very often shared by different generations and socioeconomic groups with disregard for their actual experiences (Cherkasov, 2006).

Komlev et al. (1997) found that about 25% of all respondents in Tatarstan considered mass media as their main source of information about police. In a national study, Mazaev (2004) confirmed that more than 70% of all information about police received by residents of Russia is taken from fictional movies and TV shows. The FOM study of 2005 reported that 75% of all respondents had no prior contact with police when they gave their opinion about

issues related to police satisfaction. More than half of the respondents reported watching TV for more than three hours a day (FOM, 2005).

As a result of this research, a call was made to improve media-police relations by creating special TV shows depicting positive aspects of the police and releasing more information about the efficacy of police work (Tumentsev, 2002). While these results are very important in understanding poor levels of public satisfaction with the police, they refer to only two aspects: the perceptions of police work as portrayed by media coverage and personal experiences. The existing entertainment nature of media coverage (so-called infotainment) provides little hope that negative stereotyping and dramatization of police work in Russia can be avoided in the future.

Moral Characteristics of Russian Policemen: Ideals and Reality

Some researchers interested in public-police satisfaction focused on the moral and personal characteristics of Russian police personnel. Characteristics were collected and compared between the citizens' perceived ideal and actual police officers. The result was a serious discrepancy between the ideal and actual characteristics, which was often cited as a reason for poor public attitudes toward the police.

In 2004, ROMIR conducted a survey that collected "wishes" from Russian citizens concerning what would be desirable characteristics of Russian police. In a representative sample of Russia, the top two rankings for desirable policemen traits were "honesty" (39%) and "professionalism" (19%) (ROMIR, 2005b). The ideal wishes contrasted quite differently with citizen descriptions of actual Russian policemen. The descriptions consisted of very different characteristics, with "rudeness" ranking number one. Rudeness was ranked the number one negative characteristic of Russian policemen by 47% of respondents in a study by Cherkasov in 2006, 49% of respondents in Mazaev's 2004 study, and by 53% of all respondents in the Gudkov et al. (2004) investigation. Likewise, other typical characteristics of Russian police officers were not perceived as positive. Gryazonva (2006) reported that 36% of respondents stated officers were "indifferent"; Gudkov et al. (2004) found 48% of respondents reported police were "corrupted"; 29% said officers were "dishonest" (Mazaev, 2004); and 9% described police as "greedy" (FOM, 2005).

The literature supports an assumption that a major issue regarding public-police satisfaction in Russia is the lack of commitment by the police themselves to provide basic public service. Instead, the police appear to see their role as purely that of a government functionary with apparent disregard for public service or approval. This problem is directly related to the historical foundations and development of the contemporary Russian police. These precedents, combined with a lack of public accountability prior to 2005, have been instrumental in creating the persistent present-day public-police satisfaction problem. Before 2005, there were few (if any) attempts to create objective evaluations or independent public accountability for police actions.

It is also important to discuss one interesting theme found by this group of researchers. A theme that consistently emerged was the unrealistically high public expectations by citizens for Russian police performance (Mitroshenkov, 2004). This study reported that officers were not only expected to have impeccable honesty while being completely devoted to their duties but also to treat everyone with absolute fairness while possessing exceptional

professional ethics. Concurrently, citizens failed to apply the same high moral standards to themselves. Mitroshenkov (2004) reported that 18% of respondents stated there are situations where you have to break the law. Andreev (2005) found that 49% of all respondents in a national sample advocated tax evasion, and 57% said that prostitution was acceptable.

Mazaev (1997) found in a 1996 study that 58% of all respondents believed it was appropriate to disobey police orders, and 11% believed that cooperation with police was completely impossible. Likewise, Andreev (2005) reported that 34% of all respondents in a national sample agreed with that it was appropriate to disobey police officers, and Egoryshev (1997a) found that more than 20% of respondents reported they were absolutely not ready to cooperate with police in any situation.

Police Officers' Self-Reports Related to Public Satisfaction With Policing

The next group of studies reinforces the perception differences between the public and police officers in matters related to policing as also seen in the previous section. The police officers were surveyed about the public dissatisfaction problem (Egoryshev, 1997a, 1997b; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; Mazaev et al., 2003; Tarasova, 2004; Vorob'ev, 1992). The results indicated that police officers were fully aware of the serious public dissatisfaction problem concerning their work. In 1992, Vorob'ev found that only 4% of police officers surveyed in the Ural region stated they were proud of being a police officer, and 25% experienced negative attitudes from citizens while working. Egoryshev (1997a) reported in his dissertation that during the period from 1994 to 1995, only 6.5% of all police officers surveyed in Tatarstan were satisfied with the quality of their work. Egoryshev (1997b) also found that 18.5% of all policemen surveyed in Tatarstan thought that only citizens who had no personal contact with police could be fully satisfied with their work. In the same study, 10.2% of the officers asserted that police do not have any legitimacy among Russian residents (Egoryshev, 1997b).

When police officers were asked about the reasons for public dissatisfaction, their answers are very different from those of Russian citizens. WCIOM (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006) found that all police officers blamed the mass media for biased and negative coverage, and this was the major reason for poor public police satisfaction. The negative media story evolution is partly a combination of two factors. Negative media stories stem from, first, the demise of a state-controlled media that exercised censorship while producing incessant "good news" propaganda about the police, and second, the emergence of a relatively non-censored and open market based "bad news sells" approach in the post-communist period (Los, 2002).

Police officers reported other reasons to explain why the public is dissatisfied with the police. The officers stated government funding is inadequate, and Russian citizens have a poor understanding and respect of the law and poor management from the MVD leadership (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006). Two studies conducted in 1998 and 2004 found that 69.7% to 77.3% of all police officers reported that underfunding was the primary reason for poor police performance; 33.7% to 42.6% responded that an absence of adequate human resources was a major contributing problem; and 21.7% to 39% said poor management skills affected performance (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006).

Interestingly, none of the public concerns about corruption, misuse of power, or brutality were identified in the police survey-self reports as contributing to public dissatisfaction. From this review of the literature, it seems clear that neither the police nor citizens have been taking responsibility for building new or improving existing public-police relationships. They often blame one another for increased crime rates and the general failure to solve crimes. The collective police and citizen attitudes have contributed to creating a conflict environment wherein citizens are not predisposed to cooperate with or obey the police, and perhaps the police are unwilling to initiate self-reform.

Although these studies provided some explanations regarding public dissatisfaction with the Russian police, little empirical research was found that examined relationships between low levels of public-police satisfaction, distrust of government institutions, and fear of crime. These three variables are all logical consequences of the social disorganization and government legitimacy crisis following the dissolution of the USSR. Beck and Robertson (2003) included these three variables in an examination primarily concerned with victimization and crime in Russia. They posited that there was no association between fear of crime and police satisfaction. Their research focused on victimization, and the authors suggested the use of public trust of the police and police satisfaction variables to possibly explain citizens' fear of crime.

Distrust of Criminal Justice Institutions in the Post-Communist Countries

The post-communist and post-authoritarian societies traditionally exhibit low levels of criminal justice institutional trust (Goldsmith, 2005; Mishler & Rose, 2005). Gudkov and Dubin (2006) reported that in North American and Western European countries, the level of police trust ranged from 55% to 66%. Comparatively, in Eastern European post-communist countries, trust of the police varied from 10% to 45%, and Russia ranked next to last (Ukraine was last at 10%) on the list, with 15% reporting they trust the police.

In an effort to develop a better understanding of the problem about public trust of police in Russia, several studies focused on the issue of police officer motivations. In a study by Gryaznova (2006) conducted in 2004, 63% of all respondents in a national Russian sample reported that Russian police behavior conformed to their personal self-interests with little concern for public safety interests. Cherkasov (2006) found that 45% of all respondents in a 2004 survey agreed that police do not share the public interests of protection and social order. What is more remarkable is that 51% of Russian police officers interviewed in 2005 by WCIOM also somewhat agreed with such statements. Of the officers, 59% stated that police are protecting the interests of all citizens; 26% believed that police are primarily protecting the interests and rights of people in powerful positions; and 25% stated that police are protecting only wealthy citizens (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006).

The problem of institutional trust in Russia was illustrated by Kolennikova (2006) when she reported that only 8% to 9% of Russian citizens believed that President Putin was protecting the interests of everyone. In 2003, 44% of respondents were convinced that the president is acting only in the interests of people in power. Likewise, 29% of respondents identified oligarchs as those favored by the president (Kolennikova, 2006).

It has been suggested that disenchantment with the liberal market ideology, a weak state, an absence of public accountability, and political alienation are responsible for the

high levels of government-based distrust in post-communist societies like Russia (Galeotti, 1993; Goldsmith, 2003; Mawby, 1999; Uildriks & Reenen, 2003). The literature also connects increased levels of criminal justice institution distrust in post-communist countries directly with increasing perceptions of personal risk, insecurity, and fear of crime (Beck & Robertson, 2003; Goldsmith, 2005; Los, 2002).

Post-communist countries that have demonstrated a pervasive distrust of government (including the criminal justice system) have typical characteristics, including societal anxiety and feelings of personal insecurity. These characteristics are directly related to social disorganization and failure of institutional legitimacy (Gudkov et al., 2004; Rutkevitch, 1998). ROMIR (2005c) demonstrated the deep crisis with legitimacy throughout Russia when 52% of respondents in a representative sample stated that they did not trust any Russian governmental institution. Consistent with the logic of the motive-based theory of trust, researchers have called for a new public policy designed to create a "shared vision." The policy's objective would be to help Russian citizens regain trust in government and overcome their alienation (Uildriks & Reenen, 2003).

In summary, a review of the literature shows that substantial work about public satisfaction and trust of the Russian police and criminal justice system has been accomplished. However, there is little empirical analysis that has measured the relationship between two major characteristics of socially disorganized post-communist societies: distrust of the criminal justice system and fear of crime. Moreover, virtually no research was found to examine how these two factors of disorganized post-communist society can explain the low levels of satisfaction of Russian police.

Theoretical Framework

In this study, we assume that poor public satisfaction with the Russian police may be related to a general public distrust of the other criminal justice institutions and fear of crime. Such an assumption is supported by the motive-based trust theory, and it also provides a basis for understanding the impact of institutional trust on public-police satisfaction.

Most theories on institutional trust postulate that instrumental trust is the major explanation of trust-related relationships. The instrumental explanation of trust deals with predictability of actions and the fulfillment of societal expectations. Institutions that tend to act in an unpredictable fashion and violate societal expectations are not trusted. While the element of instrumental trust is important, motive-based trust is also a significant component of the theoretical understanding of institutional trust (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Motive-based trust relates to the trust of authorities' intentions or a belief that the institution is acting in the best interests of an individual. Tyler and Huo (2002) suggest that for the power institutions like the police, public trust is related to how the police use their authority to serve the best interest of those they are charged to serve and protect. An empirical investigation about the two types of institutional trust concluded that motive-based trust explained more of the public's acceptance of authorities' decisions than instrumental trust. The difference between motive-based and instrumental institutional trust was directly related to public dissatisfaction with the power institutions. Tyler and Huo suggest that a "failure to make correct prediction or decision does not destroy the motive-based trust, if we believe authorities

have good intentions” (p. 63). On the other hand, the feeling of institutional distrust produced by a perception of wrong intentions, or unshared interests, can influence the assessment of the institution by an individual despite unbroken expectations. Thus, the theory of motive-based trust supports the notion that public trust of the police can be a predictor of public satisfaction with police, but it is a directional relationship whereby satisfaction does not necessarily explain trust.

Research Questions

The analysis that follows is grounded in the motive-based theory. This theory assumes that public trust of the criminal justice system depends on a societal belief that each of the institutions is acting with the best intentions and in accordance with the best interests of the citizens to provide protection and security. The lack of shared motives is hypothesized to be a major reason why Russian citizens exhibit distrust of the basic criminal justice institutions. Consequently, citizen distrust of those institutions is directly related to the public’s dissatisfaction with the Russian police. Fear of crime is high in most transitioning post-communist societies and is hypothesized to be a factor related to dissatisfaction with the Russian police.


The hypotheses of this study are:

1. Fear of crime has an inverse relationship with public-police satisfaction. It is expected that as fear of crime increases, police satisfaction will decrease.
2. Criminal justice system trust has a positive relationship with public police satisfaction. It is expected that as public trust of the criminal justice system increases, public-police satisfaction will increase.
3. Fear of crime and trust of the criminal justice system are covariates. It is anticipated that fear of crime and trust of the criminal justice system have an inverse relationship. It is expected that as variance in fear of crime increases, variance of the trust of the criminal justice system will decrease and vice versa.

Criminal justice institutional trust and fear of crime are known to be dependent on each other. Previous research has also shown that trust of the criminal justice system and fear of crime can have negative reciprocal relationships. Distrust of the criminal justice institutions can precipitate fear of crime and simultaneously create higher levels of fear (Gryaznova, 2006; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the relationship between criminal justice institutional trust and public satisfaction with the police is influenced by the covariation between fear of crime and distrust of the criminal justice institutions. The same is true about the relationship between the fear of crime and public satisfaction with police. Figure 1 displays the research model.

In addition to testing the hypotheses, a trend analysis is provided for the three study variables measured in the longitudinal survey. The results are compared with the official MVD crime rates for the same time period. The trend analysis and subsequent comparison provides additional data related to potential associations between public satisfaction with the police and crime rates in Russia. The results can be used to interpret the potential of a motive-based theory to explain public satisfaction with the Russian police.

Figure 1
Research Model



Methodology

Data Collection

Data analyzed in this study were collected as a part of an annual MVD survey. In 1998, the MVD initiated this survey in all 85 regions of Russia to examine police satisfaction, fear of crime, and citizen trust of criminal justice. The survey instrument was created by the Russian Ministry of Interior Affairs and directed to the regional MVD offices in the Instruction to the Decree #337, adopted on June 4, 1997 (MVD, 1997). The instruction included the exact wording, list and sequence of the questions, and coding for answers. The same survey instrument is repeated annually.

The data were collected from the Volgograd Region during April and May from 1998 until 2005. The survey consisted of 20 items and was administered through personal interviews and simultaneously collected by multiple interviewers. The Volgograd Law Academy used faculty and students to collect the data.

The interviews were conducted in the offices of selected factories, companies, or government agencies. For the retired population, the interviews were conducted in the household of respondents. The unemployed population was surveyed in the offices of unemployment government agencies (the Offices of Social Protection).

A minimum of three attempts were made to contact selected individuals to ensure high rates of participation in the survey. For each year, the response rate varied from 92% to 99% of the sample size. Those individuals who refused to participate or were unavailable after multiple contact attempts were replaced with another individual using the same sampling methodology. The interviews were performed using paper answer sheets provided by the

instructions to Decree #337, adopted on June 4, 1997 (MVD, 1997). No audio or video recording was conducted during the interviews. Paper answer sheets were completed by the interviewers who were reading questions to the respondent.

Sampling

A multistage systematic quota sampling method was used to sample the Volgograd Region's population. The Region is one of the 85 administrative districts in Russia and lies 500 miles south of Moscow. The region's population is about 2,673,000, and 75% live in the principal urban areas. It is one of the largest southern agricultural regions in the Russian Federation, and 78% of its territory, consisting of 112,900 square kilometers, is used for agricultural purposes (RAS, 2006).

Each year, 500 participants were interviewed with a total aggregate of 4,000 over the eight-year period. The sampling quota was calculated using official demographic information from the State Statistical Department in the Volgograd Region. The following categories were used to develop the quota elements: proportion of the urban/rural population, gender, geographical crime rate areas, and professional occupation. Geographical crime rate areas were developed by counting the reported crime incidents and classifying them as low, medium, or high. The proportions were calculated for each year separately.

During the first stage of the sampling process, researchers selected the administrative districts that most closely represented the study population criteria. This sampling methodology permitted a variation of $\pm 1.5\%$ from the calculated proportions for each of four sampling quota categories.

During the second stage of sampling, public and private organizational units were selected from the official government registry of organizations within a specific administrative area. The list of organizations was provided by the regional administration and included businesses, factories, educational institutions, and government agencies. To include the unemployed and retired population, pension foundations and unemployment agencies were also included. Participant selection was done by using the same four sampling classifications described above.

For the third stage of the sampling process, particular individuals were selected for an interview. The candidate list was alphabetized, and then systematic sampling was used with an interval of 20 to 25 individuals. The participant interval varied by the survey year. No quotas were applied at this stage of selection.

Measurement Instrument

Three survey dimensions were selected for our study from the annual MVD survey: police satisfaction, fear of crime, and trust of the criminal justice system. The survey instrument measured other dimensions related to victimization, policing, and trust of other government institutions; however, we selected variables to specifically focus on public satisfaction with the police.

The survey variable of public satisfaction with police work was operationalized as the overall public assessment of current police work effectiveness in the respondent's region or town.⁹ The variable, measuring public trust of criminal justice institutions, was operationalized

as a belief that societal institutions, such as the police, courts, prosecutor's office, and the federal intelligence agency,¹⁰ share the same motives and act in the best intentions of the respondent.¹¹ The variable "fear of crime" was defined as a predominant fear of becoming a victim of the crime. The exact wording of the survey instrument questions and its English translation is presented in Appendix A.

The survey item that included fear of crime was a ranked response item. The respondent was required to select only three of the seven items and then assign a rank to the items. The respondents who marked "fear of becoming a victim of the crime" (see Appendix A) as one of their three major concerns were coded as respondents who experienced fear of crime. The other two choices did not have any influence on the coding. The respondents who didn't choose "fear of becoming a victim of the crime" as one of their three major fears were coded as not experiencing fear of crime.

Data Analysis Plan

Descriptive statistics, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and structural equation modeling (SEM) were used in our analysis. SEM is a statistical method of regression analysis used primarily for non-experimented large samples affected by a set of interrelated variables (Joreskog, 1994). The theoretical concept of criminal justice system trust was measured by four separate variables pertaining to trust of the courts, the prosecutor's office, the federal intelligence agency, and the police. Because of the categorical nature of the observed variables, polychoric correlations are employed in the measurement model. The EQS 6.1 software package (MVSoft, 2005) was used to perform both CFA and SEM. The Bentler-Bonnet coefficient and Comparative Fit Coefficients were applied as criteria of goodness-of-fit statistics.

CFA with polychoric correlations has a statistical restriction pertaining to the minimum number of required cell frequencies. The estimation of polychoric correlations is done using contingency tables that require every cell to have a minimum frequency. In this study, the survey instrument imposed additional analytical restrictions because of the use of a categorical response structure. Only polychoric correlations can be used with this type of response. Therefore, it was not possible to include control variables such as age, gender, or other socioeconomic characteristics. The inclusion of these control variables would have created an internal validity problem concerning the coefficient estimates. Substantially large samples allow each cell to have the required frequency to ensure that the statistical model is not violated (Joreskog, 1994). The existing sample size of 4,000 respondents was insufficient to perform polychoric correlations with no more than eight degrees of freedom (Bentler, 2004). With the current research hypotheses, the model already had eight degrees of freedom and additional variables could not be added.

Findings

Observed Trends Compared With MVD Official Reports of Crime, Solved, and Unsolved Cases

The trends of survey respondent perceptions about fear of crime, satisfaction with police, and trust of the major criminal justice institutions are shown in Table 1. The trend patterns

are relatively stable with “fear of becoming a crime victim” increasing by about 6% since 1998. Fear of crime may be higher than reflected by the small percentage change in 2005; almost half of those surveyed ranked fear of becoming a crime victim as their primary concern. This is discussed in greater detail in the following section.

As fear of crime increased during the past eight years, public satisfaction with police work trended in the opposite direction and declined overall by 4.2%. While the overall rate of decline was relatively small, it was in the negative direction. This unsatisfactory trend stresses the importance of increasing the accuracy of measuring public satisfaction with police. Simultaneously, potential explanations for the pervasive negative citizen attitudes should be pursued. The negative trend has continued despite MVD policy reform efforts.

Data pertaining to trust of the major criminal justice institutions exhibited little change. Distrust of criminal justice system institutions was high in most years. Trust of the police and FSB for any given year is substantially lower than trust of the courts and state attorney’s office. The high levels of “don’t know” responses confound the observed results. Regardless, the overall trends indicate institutional distrust is persistent during the eight-year period with little overall improvement.

All three of the study variables exhibited little variation over the eight-year period. In an attempt to interpret the survey trends, a comparison was done using registered crimes and rates of solved and unsolved crimes for the same time frame. The number of officially recorded (reported) crimes increased by about 50% during the survey period. In 1998, there were 2,582,000 crimes registered in Russia, which constitutes 17 offenses per every 1,000 people.¹² In 2006, the number of recorded crimes reached 3,855,373, which resulted in 27 registered crimes per every 1,000 people.¹³ In 2003, the number of solved crimes was equal to 1,518,659, compared with 1,158,714 of unsolved crimes reported in the same year. In 2006, the number of solved crimes reached 1,794,517, versus 2,032,400 crimes that remained unsolved. This data indicates that solved crimes increased 12% compared, with a 43% increase for unsolved crimes from 2003 until 2006. The data discussed are based on the official MVD statistics¹⁴ which may be problematic. However, assuming the errors are systematic, the MVD data may reflect trends.

When the changes in reported crimes, solved crimes, and unsolved crimes are compared with the relatively flat survey responses of Table 1, the patterns are markedly different. Response rates related to fear of crime, satisfaction with police work, and institutional trust were relatively stable while reported crime and unsolved cases soared.

The Russian population experienced negative growth during the past 10 years while the number of registered crimes continued to increase during the same period. This trend provides some corroboration to support the probability of higher crime rates. Even though this is not enough to conclude that crime rates and actual police performance have no influence on fear of crime, public satisfaction with police, or criminal justice institutional trust, it may suggest that other factors could be influencing our study variables. The increase in poor police performance without a concurrent increase in public dissatisfaction with police suggests that other factors are involved in shaping public attitudes about the police. It is feasible that unsolved and solved crime rate trends can serve as indicators of police performance while observing the caveat that a significant number of crimes are unreported.

Our results pertaining to all three of the study variables appear to be within the range of similar findings reported in the literature. Table 2 presents a compilation of results from

Table 1
Trend Analysis for Fear of Crime, Satisfaction with Police Work, and Trust to the Criminal Justice Institution: 1998 to 2005.

Years	Fear of crime			Satisfaction with police work			Trust of the courts			Trust of the prosecutor's office			Trust of the FSB			Trust of the police		
	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK
1998	42.8%	57.2%	27.8%	29.8%	42.4%	15.4%	47.8%	36.8%	16.2%	41.6%	42.2%	16.2%	8.6%	41%	50.4%	23.4%	43%	33.6%
1999	42.6%	57.4%	28%	29.4%	42.6%	19.6%	39%	41.4%	16%	32.8%	51.2%	16%	9%	38.8%	52.2%	23.4%	31.4%	45.2%
2000	47%	53%	23.4%	29.6%	47%	22%	47.8%	30.2%	22.8%	34.8%	42.4%	22.8%	11.2%	46.2%	42.6%	23.6%	29.8%	46.6%
2001	47.6%	52.4%	27%	25.4%	47.6%	21.2%	37%	41.8%	20%	27.2%	52.8%	20%	8%	37.8%	54.2%	29.8%	30.8%	39.4%
2002	42.4%	57.6	19.2%	35.8%	45%	21.6%	39.4%	39%	20.4%	29%	50.6%	20.4%	9.4%	36.4%	54.2%	29%	30.8%	40.2%
2003	47.4%	52.6%	26.5%	29.8%	43.7%	27.2%	41.6%	31.2%	28.4%	41.6%	30%	28.4%	13.2%	46.3%	40.5%	30%	23.2%	46.8%
2004	48%	52%	26.2%	27.8%	46%	19%	45%	36%	27.6%	44.2%	28.2%	27.6%	11.8%	46.6%	41.6%	25.4%	23.8%	50.8%
2005	48%	52%	29.7%	25.6%	44.7%	22.8%	40.4%	36.8%	27.2%	43%	29.8%	27.2%	11.6%	48.2%	40.2%	23.8%	34.6%	41.6%

Note: DK = don't know

Table 2
Summary of Empirical Findings Related to the Variables
“Fear of Crime,” “Trust of the Criminal Justice Institutions,”
and “Public Satisfaction with the Police”: 1990 to 2006

Author(s)	Year	Fear of crime		Trust of cj institutions			Police satisfaction		
		Yes	No	Yes	No	DK	Yes	No	DK
Krivel'skaya	1990	74.1%	25.9%				2.9%	61.5%	35.6%
FOM	1996	70%	30%						
Zvekić	1996						10.2	47.7	19.8
Egoryshev	1997						24%	32.4%	43.6%
Shubkin	1997	66%	–						
Mazaev ¹	1997						10%	30%	60%
Bezaev ²	1999	30.6%		69.4%	57%	–	–		
ZIRCON ³	1999			17.5%	55.5%	27%			
ICVS	2000	64.8%	31.6%				24.7%	50.1%	25.2%
Glin'skiy	2000	64%	–						
ZIRCON	2001			11%	44%	45%			
ROMIR ⁴	2003	34%	–						
Beck, Robertson	2003	61	39%						
Gudkov et al. ⁵	2004			48%	40%	12%			
ROMIR	2004			5%	40%	–			
Levada ⁶	2004			10%	55%	35%			
FOM	2005						43%	38%	19%
ROMIR ⁷	2005	26%							
Dzuev et al. ⁸	2005			26%	46.2%	27.8%			
Robertson	2005			45%	39%	15%			
Ivanova, Shubkin	2005	34%	–						
Lelekov, Tyamin	2005	60%	–						
ROMIR ⁹	2006			10%	–	–			
Gryaznova	2006			25%	70%	4%			
Gudkov, Dubin	2006			24%	65%	11%			
Cherkasov	2006						36%	43%	21%
Nevirko	2006			47.7% ¹⁰			42.7%	29%	28.3%
				38.3%					
				35.7%					
				41.7%					
Gudkov ¹¹	2006	23%	70%	27%	38%	35%			

1. Satisfaction with police was measured as a positive/negative change in that occurred for the last three years.

2. The trust was measured for police only.

3. The trust was measured for the FSB agencies only

4. This study measures a concern about crime rates more than the fear of crime.

5. The trust was measured for police only.

6. The numbers are averaged for the period of 1994 to 2004.

7. This study measures a concern about crime rates more than the fear of crime.

8. Only refers to the public trust of police in Ossetia region of Russia.

9. The trust was measured for Supreme Court only.

10. The numbers refer to court (47.7%), prosecutor's office (38.2%), FSB (35.7%), and police (41.7%).

11. The trust was measured for prosecutor's office and courts only.

different studies using similar variables. A large variation can be observed pertaining to fear of crime reports. These ranged from 26% (ROMIR, 2005c) to 74.1% (Krivel'skaya, 1990). In our study, fear of crime ranged between 42% and 48%, and this is similar to the average range reported in the literature.

Variations between the literature and our findings may be explained by differences in both operationalization and measurement of the "fear of crime" concept. In many studies,¹⁵ the fear of crime concept is measured more as concern with growing crime rates rather than the specific personal fear of becoming a crime victim. These methodological differences may contribute to the findings variations in the literature.

The results presented in Table 2 indicate that criminal justice institutions in Russia experienced a significant deficit of trust. The distrust of the police, courts, and the federal intelligence agency fluctuated from 38% (Gudkov, 2000) to 70% (Gryaznova, 2006). Our survey found from 30% to 41% of respondents did not trust the courts; 29% to 52% distrusted the prosecutor's office; 36% to 48% did not trust the FSB; and 33% to 50% distrusted the police.

Overall, our study results are similar to others with the exception that our findings are somewhat more optimistic. A possible explanation is that the data were collected by a MVD agency, thereby creating intentional or unintentional internal validity issues. Another explanation may relate to sampling differences used by other studies. Satisfaction with police shown in Table 2 varies from 2.9% (Krivel'skaya, 1990) to 43% (FOM, 2005). Our results shows public satisfaction with the police ranged from 25% to 35%, which is within the average of other findings.

The same can be said about the rates of public dissatisfaction with the police. Other researchers have reported public dissatisfaction with the police from 29% (Nevirko et al., 2006) to 61% (Krivel'skaya, 1990). Our results regarding dissatisfaction with police varied from 42% to 47%. The differences may be because of methodological factors that include different study populations, definitions, and measurements of the satisfaction with police variable.

Hypotheses Testing Results

A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to measure the four different indicators' respective relationships to the concept of criminal justice system. The four indicators were V3, Trust of the court system; V4, Trust of the prosecutorial system; V5, Trust of the FSB; and V6, Trust of the police. All four indicators were found to be significant at an alpha level of .05. The standardized regression loadings for each trust indicator were higher than 0.5. The standardized factor loading ranged from .555 for indicator V6 (trust of police) to .907 for indicator V4 (trust of the prosecutorial system). The results are shown in Figure 1. This shows that the concept "criminal justice system trust" has high construct validity (Maruyama, 1998).

The structural model results were significant for both fear of crime and criminal justice system trust. The coefficient for fear of crime was significant at $-.036$ and for the criminal justice system trust at $.403$. The R square result was $.162$.

To evaluate the possibility of discrepancies between the data and theoretical model presented in Figure 1, two goodness-of-fit estimates were calculated. The Bentler Bonnet normed fit index was equal to $.831$, and the comparative fit index was equal to $.832$. These

results are considered good/excellent results, indicating minimum discrepancies between the data and hypothesized model (Maruyama, 1998).

An analysis of covariation between fear of crime and criminal justice system trust produced nonsignificant results (see Figure 1). There was no statistically significant covariation between the measurement errors for each of the indicators V3-V6 and the variable of satisfaction with police. Values for each measurement error are presented in Figure 1. None of the four indicators measuring criminal justice institution trust had statistically significant covariation with the variable of “public satisfaction with police.” This provides empirical evidence that criminal justice system trust and public satisfaction with police can be closely related variables, but they are not measuring the same concept (Bentler, 2004).

Therefore the decisions concerning the hypotheses were:

1. The relationship between fear of crime and satisfaction with police was significant and negative; therefore, the hypothesis is accepted. Even though the relationship was significant, the value of the standardized regression coefficient was low (-.036), which indicates a weak correlation.
2. Criminal justice system trust was significant and positively related to public satisfaction with police, and the hypothesis was accepted. The value of standardized regression coefficient was .403 indicating the correlation strength was medium.
3. Fear of crime and criminal justice system trust did not have a significant covariation, and, therefore, this hypothesis was rejected.

The trend analysis results indicate that actual police performance had little relationship to public attitudes about fear of crime, satisfaction with police work, and criminal justice system trust. This would infer that extraneous factors could be affecting the persistent downward public satisfaction trends seen in the longitudinal survey data. It would be advantageous to include known factors identified in the literature in an empirical model for further testing on availability.

Criminal justice system trust was the most influential study variable and had more explanation for public satisfaction with police than fear of crime. Fear of crime and criminal justice system trust did not covary, indicating these variables are measuring different concepts.

Limitations and Discussion

Limitations

There are several important limitations of this study. The empirical data used in this study represented one of the 85 regions in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to all regions of the Russian Federation. Likewise, the same restriction applies to fear of crime. However, a comparison of regional demographic and socioeconomic characteristics with the entire Russian population shows the Volga Region is not drastically different (RAS, 2006). Given that the demographics are similar, and that the Russian police system has a centralized structure, the use of empirical data from the Volgograd Region may well be representative of other regions.

Previous research (Beck & Robertson, 2003; Terrill, 1997) suggested that some caution is necessary when using data from official sources in Russia. The data used in this study

were collected under the control and for the purposes of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Thus, such data may contain intentional or unintentional biases since the Ministry is essentially doing a self-evaluation. In the absence of other sources about public-police attitudes (Terrill, 1997), it is suggested that this data should be viewed as one source of indications. Additional independent research would be helpful to confirm and provide additional confidence about the general trends observed in the Volgograd data.

The survey item structure is also a limitation of the study. As shown in Appendix A, the responses were primarily categorical. The study constructs that represent complex criminological concepts were operationalized from the categorical responses as discussed in the methodology section. The public satisfaction and trust of the criminal justice system were dichotomous variables. The fear of crime variable was included in a pick list of seven concerns. The use of categorical responses was a predetermined format directed by Decree #233 of the MVD. The choice of categorical variables most likely can be explained by the necessity to make this survey as clear and understandable as possible as directed in the Instruction to the survey instrument (MVD, 1994).

These variable restrictions limited the analysis to the use of polychoric correlation techniques as discussed in the data analysis section. The analytical restriction also affected the inclusion of traditional control variables. Internal validity of the SEM results would have been compromised by adding degrees of freedom to the model. While the absence of traditional control variables was a study limitation, the literature suggests that demographic characteristics of the Russian population (i.e., typical controls) have limited influence on public opinion about Russian police satisfaction or trust (FOM, 1998; WCIOM, 2006).

One final known limitation concerns the potential of a bi-directional relationship between the trust of the criminal justice system and satisfaction variables. There are implications in the literature that dissatisfaction with police has a direct impact on distrust of the police. In this study, our model failed to support this implication. The relationship was unidirectional and the covariance between the two variables was nonsignificant and supports a conclusion that the variables are measuring mutually exclusive concepts. The Russian literature provides implicit examples of the potential of a bi-directional relationship without empirical validation. More research is required to confirm our unidirectional findings (Beck and Robertson, 2003; Goldsmith, 2005).

This study is limited to the period of 1998 to 2005. This restriction excluded the examination of an important time in the Soviet-Russian history: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and democratic transformations of the police institution in the early 1990s. Again, the absence of other empirical information and paucity of research about public satisfaction with the police, trust of the criminal justice system, and fear of crime in Russia creates some uncertainty in the results. This study is an exploratory attempt to explain variation within the levels of public-police satisfaction.

Discussion

Public satisfaction with police in contemporary Russia has been shaped by pro-state policies of the USSR period, its collapse, and the subsequent transition to a market-based open society. These relatively recent events have generated numerous complexities that have all affected public attitudes about the police and criminal justice institutions in Russia.

This study used raw longitudinal citizen survey data to examine two variables that have been shown in the literature to affect public satisfaction with police. The two independent variables were fear of crime and criminal justice system trust.

Here, the Volgograd MVD survey analysis confirmed previous research findings related to public attitudes about police satisfaction. The research model did statistically confirm that criminal justice system trust is significantly related to public satisfaction with police. An important contribution of this survey is its longitudinal design that covered an eight-year period and used consistent measurement variables from year to year. The study is also important as it indicates the MVD's willingness to provide raw data and support independent research about public satisfaction with police and related criminal justice institutions.

The police during the USSR period were not created to provide citizen service or satisfaction. Instead, the police were a direct creature of the state designed to serve only the state's interests. One of those interests was the identification and expulsion of citizens that were not ideologically acceptable. The motives of the police (NKVD) established in 1917 were not to satisfy citizens but, instead, to ensure that they were suitable to exist in the newly formed USSR. There was little change in the Soviet police mission until the Khrushchev era. Then, there was some evidence of concern for the citizens, openness, inclusion rather than exclusion, and some attempt was made to improve the dismal nature of public police satisfaction (Bel'skiy, 2004; Fastov, 2005).

Gorbachev's major reform initiatives led to new Soviet policies requiring the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MVD) to provide "open" information related to public satisfaction with police. Any improvements that resulted from Gorbachev's reforms were relatively short-lived. Near the end of the Soviet Union era, fear of crime had increased by several magnitudes, and public attitudes about police performance and satisfaction plummeted (Efremova, 1990; Krivel'skaya, 1990).

The ultimate collapse of the USSR and subsequent transition to a democratic state created large-scale social turmoil that left no one unaffected. The police were suddenly left in a rudderless ideological vacuum and struggled to reinvent themselves. Suddenly their mission statement changed. They found themselves in a new world and severely bound by a multitude of issues that were discussed in some length earlier in this article. These factors included a dubious Soviet-era heritage, lack of funding, training, high personnel attrition, entrenched corruption and abuse of power, a major loss of salary, and a loss of social standing that for practical purposes made them all but social outcasts (Gryaznova, 2006; Kolennikova, 2006; Pustintsev, 2000; Rutkevitch, 1998; Savchenko, 1997).

Any effort to explain contemporary public satisfaction with Russian police must be within the framework of all these influences. Much work has been done related to the impact of corruption, an antipolice media stereotyping, personal characteristics of police officers themselves, and all have consistently reported dismaying outcomes. It has also been shown that these conditions are not unique to Russia. Most of the other ex-Soviet provinces share remarkably similar characteristics (RAS, 2006).

Findings from the Russian Federation seen in Table 1 are not very different from other post-communist countries. Gudkov and Dubin (2006) reported that post-communist Eastern European countries such as Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, had public distrust of the police ranging from 31% to 49% in 2004. In our study, public distrust of the police averages from 23% to 43%, which places the Russian Federation right

in the middle of this group. The study by Zvekic (1996) reported that public dissatisfaction with police for countries such as Latvia, Poland, Romania, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, fluctuated from 36% to 53% for 1996, whereas our study found dissatisfaction rates of 42% to 47%. The similarities between our findings and other post-communist countries suggest that similar processes of social disorganization in the post-totalitarian societies are more than likely influencing the study variables.

Although the results reported in our study may not be the lowest among the group of post-communist countries, the findings on all three study variables are troubling. The average indicators related to public satisfaction with police in the countries of Western Europe and North America do not go below 55% (Gudkov & Dubin, 2006). For countries such as England, Canada, France, United States, and Sweden, the International Criminal Victim Survey (ICVS) reported that fear of crime rates in 1996 only ranged from 10% to 35% (ICVS, 1996). In 2000, the same countries reported public satisfaction with police work in the range from 61% to 88% (ICVS, 2000). Low levels of public satisfaction with the police and the criminal justice system are considered one of the major problems of many post-totalitarian societies, including Russia (Mawby, 1999; Uildriks & Reenen, 2003).

There are common threads that highlight the current disconnection between the major Russian criminal justice institutions and the citizens. One thread is the lack of institutional trust. It is visible in all ex-USSR countries and substantiated by the literature as discussed earlier. Therefore, we incorporated this concept of criminal justice system trust into our analytical model as a potential explanation for the pervasive levels of public dissatisfaction with police. The availability of the Volgograd MVD raw survey data provided a unique opportunity to empirically test the relationships between fear of crime, citizen trust of the criminal justice institution, and public satisfaction with police.

Our study incorporated the theory of motive-based trust espoused by Tyler and Huo (2002). They suggested that if institutional motives are in conflict with citizen motives, distrust can result, which produces perceptions of wrong intentions and unshared common interests. Moreover, they found motive-based and institutional trust were directly related to public dissatisfaction with power institutions like the police. An interesting feature of this theorized relationship is its tendency to be unidirectional: trust can influence satisfaction while satisfaction does not necessarily impact trust.

Our model results support the motive-based theory of Tyler and Huo (2002). Consistent with the motive-based theory, citizens reported that Russian police do not share common motives regarding public safety and citizen protection. A relatively large segment of the Russian population believes that the police are only interested in protecting powerful and wealthy individuals. Citizens do not perceive that police are using their authority to serve the best interests of the ordinary citizens. These citizen attitudes reflect the insidious and pervasive level of distrust resulting from divergent interests and incongruous intentions. The failure of an institution to make consistent correct decisions does not permanently create distrust if the institutional intentions are well meant. Conversely, if the institutional intentions are perceived to be based on self-serving interests that are contradictory to shared motives, distrust ensues that is reflected in public satisfaction with the institutions. The empirical findings of our study provide support and confirmation of the motive-based theory (Tyler and Hou, 2002; Cherkasov, 2006; Gudkov & Dubin, 2006; ROMIR, 2005c).

The literature has convincingly established that a lack of criminal justice institutional trust is a dominant feature of post-Soviet Union societies (Gudkov et al., 2004; Los, 2002; Uildriks & Reenen, 2003). Since the Volgograd MVD survey measured citizen attitudes related to trust of the courts, prosecutor's office, FSB, and the police, it was an important source of raw data useful for creating an explanatory model related to public satisfaction with the police (see Figure 1).

The model results supported the motive-based theory of institutional trust and its direct relationship to citizen satisfaction. The four Volgograd survey-based indicators measured institutional trust and were significantly related to public satisfaction with police (see Figure 1). While the survey data related to fear of becoming a victim of crime were significant in the model, it was small (- .036) and negative as predicted by the literature (see Figure 1). The substantial influence on public satisfaction with police was criminal justice system trust. Surprisingly, there was no covariation between fear of crime and criminal justice system trust. However, the trend analysis (see Table 1) supports this outcome. While police performance dramatically worsened during the survey period, there was little change in fear of crime or public satisfaction with police.

The collective influences of the anti-citizen Soviet era police, major social upheaval created by the government's collapse, and then the struggle to convert to a market-based open society has left all the criminal justice institutions struggling to establish public legitimacy. What this study has shown and confirmed is the deep-rooted public dissatisfaction with the police. This is not a new finding, however; the raw longitudinal Volgograd survey data did provide a unique opportunity to create and test an explanatory model to examine salient variables theorized to influence public satisfaction with the police. What the empirical testing did confirm was the direct impact of criminal justice system trust on public satisfaction with police and the lack of a relationship to fear of crime.

The policy implications are clear. The MVD has to increase its efforts to establish public trust in the criminal justice institutions if there is going to be any near-term amelioration of public satisfaction with police. The critical influence of institutional trust is well established in the literature, by theory, and is confirmed by this study.

Consistent with the findings of this study, the Russian Supreme Court has already made some attempts to address the issue of deep distrust of Russian court system by the Russian citizenry. The Russian Supreme Court (2006) adopted the Federal Principal Program "Development of Court System in Russia for 2007–2011 years." The program includes a number of improvements to the existing court system with increased funding and an accountability mechanism for court administration. From the program's 14 court system evaluation criteria that were established, five are related to public perceptions of the court and its administration. Appendix A of the program created benchmarks for public trust of the court system as one of the major criteria to evaluate the work of the courts. Part of the criteria requires that the level of trust should increase from 27% to 37% for 2008, then up to 42% for 2009, 45% by 2010, and finally 50% in 2011 (Supreme Court, 2006). Based on findings of this study, it is our belief that similar policy documents and measures need to be undertaken by the MVD of Russia to improve the situation with distrust and, consequently, influence the public satisfaction of police in Russia.

Appendix A

I. Public satisfaction with the police:

A. Exact wording in Russian questionnaire:

КАК БЫ ВЫ ОЦЕНИЛИ РАБОТУ СОТРУДНИКОВ ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЙ ОВД (МИЛИЦИИ) ВАШЕГО РАЙОНА (ГОРОДА)?

- 1—в основном удовлетворительно
- 2—в основном неудовлетворительно
- 3—затрудняюсь ответить

B. Authors' English translation:

HOW WOULD YOU EVALUATE THE WORK OF POLICE OFFICERS IN THE OFFICE OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS (POLICE) OF YOUR REGION (CITY)?

- 1—For the most part satisfactory
- 2—For the most part unsatisfactory
- 3—Don't know

II. Public trust to criminal justice institutions:

A. Exact wording in Russian questionnaire:

В КАКОЙ МЕРЕ ВЫ ДОВЕРЯЕТЕ ИЛИ НЕ ДОВЕРЯЕТЕ СЛЕДУЮЩИМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫМ ИНСТИТУТАМ ?

(в каждой строке отметьте одну из цифр 1, 2 или 3), где 1—в основном доверяю; 2—в основном не доверяю; 3—затрудняюсь ответить

- суду 1 2 3
- прокуратуре 1 2 3
- федеральной службе безопасности 1 2 3
- органам внутренних дел 1 2 3

B. Author's English translation:

TO WHICH EXTENT DO YOU TRUST OR DO NOT TRUST THE FOLLOWING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS?

(In each line please mark 1, 2, or 3), where 1—generally I trust these institutions; 2—generally I don't trust these institutions; 3—don't know

- Courts 1 2 3
- Prosecutors' office 1 2 3
- Federal intelligence agency 1 2 3
- Offices of interior affairs (police) 1 2 3

III. Fear of crime

A. Exact wording in Russian questionnaire:

ЧТО ИЗ ПЕРЕЧИСЛЕННОГО НИЖЕ БЕСПОКОИТ ВАС БОЛЕЕ ВСЕГО? (укажите не более трех позиций)

- 1—опасение стать безработным
- 2—опасение заболеть тяжелой болезнью
- 3—опасение стать пьяницей или наркоманом
- 4—опасение за благополучие семьи и будущее детей
- 5—опасение стать жертвой преступления
- 6—опасение пострадать от катастрофы, экологического бедствия
- 7—опасение пострадать от произвола руководства, чиновников

B. Author's English translation:

FROM THE LIST BELOW, WHAT IS CONCERNING YOU MOST OF ALL? (please choose no more than three options)

- 1—fear of becoming unemployed

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

-
- 2—fear of getting seriously sick
 - 3—fear of becoming an alcoholic or drug-addict
 - 4—concern about well-being of my family and future of my children
 - 5—fear of becoming a victim of crime
 - 6—fear of becoming a victim of natural disaster or ecological catastrophe
 - 7—fear of becoming a victim of a power abuse from government officials
-

Notes

1. Also known as *MVD*.
2. The *NKVD* abbreviation stands for People's Committee of Interior Affairs.
3. The New Economic Policy, also known as NEP, was temporal liberalization of state control policy over the market that was conducted to improve the overall economic situation in Russia after WWI and the civil war of 1918–1920.
4. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of MVD USSR was a research center created within the structure of MVD for the sole purpose of conducting research studies on the MVD-related activities.
5. The registered crimes category includes only the crimes that are being reported and registered by the police officers in a special bulletin of registered crimes. These numbers omit the crimes that were never reported and crimes that were denied registration by the police for a number of reasons.
6. Decree # 337 also approved the form of the public opinion questionnaire that has been used by the regional MVD offices since 1998. This very questionnaire is used as an instrument for collecting data for this article.
7. ROMIR stands for *Russian Scientific Research of Public Opinion*; FOM stands for *Foundation of Public Opinion*; WCIOM stands for *All-Russian Institute of Public Opinion*, and LEVADA is the last name for director of the research center at LEVADA-center.
8. This is the exact term that was used in both studies by FOM and LEVADA.
9. Because the answers to this question were limited to *Yes*, *No*, and *Don't Know*, it was possible to measure both public satisfaction (*yes* answers) and public dissatisfaction (*no* answers) of police work.
10. Federal Intelligence Agency is known in Russia as *FSB*.
11. Because the answers to this question were limited to *Yes*, *No*, and *Don't know*, it was possible to measure both trust (*yes* answers) and distrust (*no* answers) of the major criminal justice institutions.
12. Data from 1998 to 2001 are being retrieved from the study by Beck and Robertson (2003) and data from 2003 to 2006 are retrieved from the official MVD website (www.mvd.ru).
13. Numbers for year 1998 are based on the population estimation for 1996; numbers for 2006 are based on the population estimates for 2006. All population estimates are retrieved from Russian Agency of Statistics web-site (www.gks.ru).
14. The MVD official data need to be taken with caution; several studies asserted that registered crime rates in Russia represent only a small portion of crimes committed. Some studies suggest that as little as 10% of all crimes are being registered by MVD (Gryaznova, 2006, Beck & Robertson, 2003).
15. This study measures a concern about crime rates, more than the fear of crime. See Table 2 for details.

References

- Andreev, A. L. (2005). Vzaimootnoshenia grazhdan i militsii [Relations between the citizenry and police]. *Bulletin of Academy of Science*, 75(4), 291–297.
- Beck, A., & Lee, R. (2002). Attitudes to corruption amongst Russian police officers and trainees. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 38, 357–372.
- Beck, A., & Robertson, A. (2003). Crime in Russia: Exploring the link between victimization and concern about crime. *International Journal of Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, 5(1), 27–46.

- Beck, A., & Robertson, A. (2005). Policing in post-Soviet Russia. In A. Pridemore (Ed.), *Ruling Russia: Law, crime, and justice in a changing society* (pp. 247–260). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bel'skiy, K. S. (2004). *Politseiskoe pravo [police law]*. Moscow: Delo & Servis.
- Bentler, P. (2004). EQS 6. Structural equations modeling. Program manual. Retrieved August 5, 2006, from www.mvsoft.com.
- Bezaev, M. N. (1999). Obschestvennoe mnenie o kriminogennoi obstanovke i deyatel'nosti vnutrennih del [Public opinion about the criminal conditions and the work of police]. *Social Research*, 12, 100–105.
- Bondarenko, T. A. (2006a). Imidg organov vnutrennih del MVD v "militseiskih" teleserialah [The image of Agencies of Interior Affairs in the "police" soap operas]. *Social Research*, 9, 114–119.
- Bondarenko, T. A. (2006b). Stereootip vospriyatiya pravoohranitelnykh organov na Dal'nem Vostoke [The stereotype about the law enforcement activities in Far East Region]. *Social Research*, 1, 99–102.
- Borisov, A. V., & Kudryavtsev, A. V. (1993). *Kontseptualnye osnovy raboty s personalom organov vnutrennih del v sovremennykh usloviyakh [Conceptual Basis for the work with the personnel of agencies of interior affairs in the modern conditions]*. Moscow: MVD Official Press.
- Budanov, A. V., & Krivel'skaya, N. V. (1994). *Puti sotsial'no-psikhologicheskogo izucheniya i ispol'zovaniya obshchestvennogo mneniya v deyatel'nosti vnutrennih del [Approaches to social-psychological research of public opinion about work of police]*. Moscow: Scientific Research Institute of State Attorney Office.
- Butler, W. E. (2003). *Russian law*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Cherkasov, R. V. (2006). SMI i obschestvennoe menie o militsii [Mass media and public opinion about police]. *Social Research*, 4, 85–88.
- Davis, R. C., Ortiz, C. W., Glinskiy, Y., Ylesseva, I., & Briller, V. (2004). A cross-national comparison of citizens' perception of the police in New York City and St. Petersburg, Russia. *Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, 27(1), 22–36.
- Dzuev, H. V., Khugaeva, A. A., & Tsogoev, T. N. (2005). *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya o deyatel'nosti MVD RSO-Alaniya [Monitoring of public opinion about work of MVD RSO-Alania]*. Vladikavkaz: Russian Academy of Science. Northern Ossetian Center of Social Research. Institute of social-political studies. MVD.
- Efremova, G. H. (1990). *Kriminalisticheskie problemy obshchestvennogo mneniya [Forensic problems of public opinion]*. Moscow: Scientific Research Institute of State Attorney's Office for Problems of Legality Strengthening and Legal Order.
- Efremova, G. H., Zvyangintsev, A. G., & Karlin, A. B. (1989). *Izuchenie obshchestvennogo mneniya v deyatel'nosti prokuratury [The research on public opinion about police]*. Moscow: MVD Official Press.
- Egoryshev, S. V. (1997a). *Organy vnutrennih del kak sotsial'naya organizatsiya: problemy ih reformirovaniya i povysheniya effektivnosti deyatel'nosti [The agencies of Interior Affairs as a social organization: The problems of their reforming and improving the effectiveness of their activity]*. Ufa: Bashkir State University.
- Egoryshev, S. V. (1997b). Organy vnutrennih del Bashkortostana v otsenkakh naseleniya [The agencies of interior affairs of Bashkortostan in public evaluations]. *Social Research*, 8, 78–87.
- Fastov, A. G. (2005). *Organy vnutrennih del Rossii: istoriya stanovleniya i razvitiya [The Agencies of Interior Affairs of Russia: History of establishment and development]* Volgograd: Volgograd Law Academy.
- FOM. (1996). Moskvitchi chustvuyt sebya nezaschishennymi na ulitsah Moskvyy [Residents of Moscow feel unsafe on the streets of their city]. Retrieved September 10, 2006, from www.fom.ru.
- FOM. (1998). Znaete li vy svoego uchastkovogo militsionera i esli da, udovletvoreny li vy ego rabotoi? [Do you know your local police officers and if yes, are you satisfied with his work?]. Retrieved on October 7, 2007, from www.fom.ru.
- FOM. (2005). Militsia i ee reputatsiya [Police and its reputation]. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from www.fom.ru.
- Frederick, A. G. (1993). Restructuring justice in Russia: A new era of challenges. *Federal probation*, 57(4), 769–786.
- Galeotti, M. (1993). Perestroika, perestrelka, pereborka: Policing in Russia in a time of change. *Europe Asia Studies*, 45(5), 769–786.
- Glinskiy, Y. (2000). Challenges of policing democracies: The Russian experience. In D. K. Das & O. Marenin (Eds.), *Challenges of policing democracies. World experience* (pp. 173–194). Australia: Gordon and Breach.

- Goldsmith, A. (2003). Policing weak states: Citizen safety and state responsibility. *Policing and Society*, 13(1), 3–21.
- Goldsmith, A. (2005). Police reform and the problem of trust. *Theoretical criminology*, 9(4), 443–470.
- Gryaznova, O. (2006). Otnoshenie zschitelei Rossii k pravoohranitel'nym organam [The attitude of Russian residents toward the law enforcement agencies]. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, 2(82), 32–46.
- Gudkov, L. (2000). Otnoshenie k pravovym institutam v Rossii [The attitude toward the legal institutions in Russia]. *Monitoring of public opinion: Economical and social changes*, 3(47), 30–39.
- Gudkov, L., & Dubin, B. (2006). Privatisatsiya politzii [Privatization of police]. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, 1(81), 58–71.
- Gudkov, L., Dubin, B., & Leonova, A. (2004). Militseiskoe nasilie i problema “politseiskogo gosudarstva” [Police violence and the problem of “police state”]. *Bulletin of Public Opinion*, 4(72), 31–47.
- ICVS. (1996). Database. Cross-tabulations. Retrieved August 4, 2006, from <http://www.unicri.it>.
- ICVS. (2000). Database. Cross-tabulations. Retrieved August 4, 2006, from <http://www.unicri.it>.
- Instruction. About the Organization of Workers and Peasants Police, Sbornik Ukazov RSFSR [Collection of Decrees of RSFSR], 75, article 813 (1918).
- Ivanova, V. A., & Shubkin, V. N. (2005). Massovaya trevozshnost' Rossiyan kak prepyatstvie k integratsii obschestva [Massive anxiety of Russians as the obstacle to the societal integration]. *Social Research*, 2, 22–28.
- Johnson, M., & Paromchik, S. (2002). Human rights and the police. In M. Pagon (Ed.), *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing firsthand knowledge with experience from the West* (pp. 349–355). Ljubljana, Slovenia: College of Police and Security Studies.
- Joreskog, K. G. (1994). On the estimation of polychoric correlations and their asymptotic covariance matrix. *Psychometrika*, 59(3), 381–389.
- Kalashnikov, V. (1996). Avtoritet sily i sya avtoriteta [The authority of the power and the power of authority]. *Police*, 10, 4–8.
- Kolennikova, O. A. (2006). Transformatsiya pravoohranitel'nyh organov v Rossii: sotsial'no-politicheskie posledstviya [Transformation of law enforcement agencies in Russia: social-political consequences]. *Social Research*, 2, 69–75.
- Komlev, Y. Y., Demidov, V. N., & Tolchinskiy, L. G. (1997). Sredstva massovoi informatsii i formirovanie obschestvennogo mneniya o pravoohranitel'noi deyatle'nosti [Mass media and formation of the public opinion about law enforcement]. *State and Law*, 8, 110–114.
- Krivel'skaya, N. V. (1990). *Obshestvennoe mnenie i ego uchet v upravlenii organami vnutrennih del [Public Opinion and its role in the management of agencies of interior affairs]*. Moscow: Academy of MVD USSR.
- Kukushkin, V. M. (1996). *Problemy povsheniya avtoriteta i prestiga sotrudnikov OVD sredi naseleniya: Metodicheskie ukazaniya dlya provedeniya zanyatii po sotsial'no-gumanitranoi podgotovke [The problems of improving the authority and prestige of the officers of agencies of interior affairs: Methodological instructions for the lecturing on social-humanitarian preparation]*. Moscow: Main Office of Human Resources, Russian, Ministry of Interior Affairs.
- Kuzminskiy, E. F., Mazaev, Y. N., & Mikchailovskaya, I. B. (1994). *Prestupnost': chto my znaem o nei. Militsiya: chto my думаем о ней [Criminality: What we know about it. Police: What we think about it]*. Moscow: NTL.
- Lelekov, V. A., & Tyamin, A. V. (2005). Zashchennost' lichnosti ot prestupnyh posyagatelstv [Personal security from crime acts]. *Social Research*, 6, 107–108.
- LEVADA. (2004). Otnoshenie k militsii sredi zchitelei krupnyh gorodov Rossii [Attitudes toward police among the residents of large urban cities in Russia]. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from www.levada.ru.
- Los, M. (2002). Post-communist fear of crime and the commercialization of security. *Theoretical criminology*, 6(2), 165–188.
- Maruyama, G. M. (1998). *Basics of structural equation modeling*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Mawby, R. (1999). The changing face of policing in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 2(3), 199–216.
- Mazaev, Y. N. (1997). Kak izmenyatsya otnoshenie naseleniya k militsii [How does the public opinion towards the police change?]. *Social Research*, 11, 68–73.

- Mazaev, Y. N. (2004). Rol' sredstv massovoi informatsii v formirovanií obschestvennogo mneniya o militsii [The role of mass media in shaping the public opinion about police]. *Social Research*, 2, 106–115.
- Mazaev, Y. N., Yakovlev, O. V., & Kamaev, B. G. (2003). *Sostoyaniye vzaimootnosheni mezhshdu militsiei i naseleniem i perspektivy ih sovershenstvovaniya* [The state of relations between the public and police and the perspectives of its improvement]. Paper presented at the Materials of the Round Table Discussion on September 26, 2003, Moscow.
- Miller, J. M. (1999). Administrative police training for an emerging democracy: An evaluation of the Moscow police command college—a research note. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 23(2), 267–276.
- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2005). What are the political consequences of trust? Test of cultural and institutional theories in Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(9), 1050–1078.
- Mitroshenkov, O. A. (2004). Otnosheniye naseleniya i gosluzhchashih k suschestvuyshemu pravoporyadku [Attitudes of population and government officials toward the existing law and order]. *Social Research*, 5, 113–120.
- Morn, F., & Sergevnin, V. (1994). Police training in modern Russia. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 18(1), 118–128.
- Morozov, V. M., & Sergevnin, V. A. (1996). Utilization of international experience of the police recruiting, selection and training in the Russian Federation. In M. Pagon (Ed.), *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing firsthand knowledge with experience from the West* (pp. 99–101). Ljubljana, Slovenia: College of Police and Security.
- MVD. (1992). Decree # 295 “Ob organizatsii izucheniya obschestvennogo mneniya o deyatel'nosti vnutrennih del'” [About organization of public opinion research on activities of Agencies of Interior Affairs] Adopted on August 22, 1992. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVD. (1994). “Metodologicheskie rekomendatsii po isucheniyu obschestvennogo mneniya i ispol'zovaniya ego rezul'tatov v organizatsii ukrepleniya pravoporyadka i bor'by s prestupnost'yu” [Mythological recommendations on study of public opinion and the use of it in the organization of law and order and crime-fighting]. Scientific-Research Institute of MVD Press.
- MVD. (1997). Decree # 337 “O merah po sovershenstvovaniyu organizatsii isucheniya obschestvennogo mneniya o deyatel'nosti organov vnutrennih del'” [About the measures for improving the organization of public opinion research about activities of agencies of interior affairs]. Adopted on June 4, 1997. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVD. (1999). Decree # 977 “Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi deyatel'nosti” [About informational propaganda]. Adopted on December 6, 1999. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVD. (2001). Decree # 319 “O sovershenstvovaniyu organizatsii vzaimodeistviya so sredstvami massovoi informatsii” [About improving the organization of interaction with mass media]. Adopted on November 12, 2001. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVD. (2005a). Decree # 718 “Ob utverzhdenii Kontsepsii sovershenstvovaniya vzaimodeistviya Ministerstva vnutrennih del Rossiiskoi Federatsii so sredstvami massovoi informatsii i obschestvennymi ob'edineniyami na 2005–2008 gody” [About approving the Conception of improving the interaction between the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Russia and mass media and non-profit organizations for 2005–2007 years]. Adopted on September 5, 2005. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVD. (2005b). Decree # 650. “Ob utverzhdenii instruksii po otsenke deyatel'nosti organov vnutrennih del'” [About approving the Instruction on evaluation of activities of agencies of interior affairs]. Adopted on August 5, 2005. *MVD archive of legal acts*.
- MVSoft. (2005). EQS—structural equation modeling software. Retrieved on January 12, 2006, from www.mvsoft.com.
- Nevirko, D. D., Shenkevitch, V. E., & Gorbach, N. A. (2006). Deyatel'nost' militsii v zerkale obschestvennogo mneniya [Police activities in the mirror of public opinion]. *Social Research*, 2, 76–84.
- Polegaev, L. (1997). Avtoritet militsii—eto avtoritet vlasti [Authority of police is authority of the government]. *Police* (2), 4–7.
- Pustintsev, B. (2000). Police reform in Russia: Obstacles and opportunities. *Policing and Society*, 10, 79–90.
- Russian Agency of Statistics (RAS). (2006). Demographic characteristics of Volgograd region. Retrieved October 4, 2006, from www.gks.ru.
- Rebrii, V. A. (1995). *Pressa o militsii* [The media about police]. Paper presented at the Problems of Contemporary Society Development, Moscow.

- Robertson, A. (2005). Criminal justice policy transfer to post-Soviet states: Case of police reform in Russia and Ukraine. *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research*, 11(1), 1–28.
- ROMIR. (2003). Tsyfry I facty: Chto volnuet rossiyan [Numbers and Facts: What concerns the Russian citizens?]. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- ROMIR. (2004). Tsyfry i facty: Doverie vlast' [Numbers and facts: Trust to the government]. Research report. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- ROMIR. (2005a). Tsyfry i facty. Glavnye problemy rossiyan [Numbers and facts. Major problems of Russians]. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- ROMIR. (2005b). Tsyfry I facty: Chto zhelaut grazdane svoei militsii [Numbers and Facts: What Russian citizens wish to their police]. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- ROMIR. (2005c). Tsyfry I facty: Doverie vlast' [Numbers and facts: Trust to the government]. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- ROMIR. (2006). Tsyfry I facty: Chestnost' vlast' [Numbers and facts: Trustworthiness of the government]. Retrieved May 4, 2006, from www.romir.ru.
- Rutkevitch, M. N. (1998). Protsessy sotsial'noi degradatsii v Rossiiskom obschestve [The processes of social degradation in Russian society]. *Social Research*, 6, 3–12.
- Savchenko, I. (1997). Veryat li nam ludi? Militsia v zerkale sotsiologicheskikh oprosov [Do people believe us? Police in the mirror of sociological surveys]. *Police*, 4, 16–18.
- Supreme Court. (2006). Federal Principal Program "Development of court system in Russia for 2007–2011 years." Retrieved August 7, 2007, from www.rg.ru.
- Shafigullin, H. S. (1995). *Pravovye i sotsiologicheskie problemy organisatsii truda rabotnikov dorogno-patrol'noi sluzhby GAI OVD [Legal and sociological problems of labor organization for the police officers of traffic services in agencies of interior affairs]*. Moscow: Moscow Law Academy.
- Tarasova, V. A. (2004). *Administrativno-pravovoe regulirovanie gosudarstvennogo kontrolya za deyatel'nost' u militsii [Administrative regulation of state control after police activities]*. Moscow: Moscow State University.
- Terrill, R. J. (1997). *World criminal justice systems: A survey*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.
- Timoshenko, S. (1997). Prospects for reform of the Russia militia. *Policing and Society*, 8, 117–124.
- Tumentsev, A. N. (2002). *Zadachi OVD regiona po povysheniu doveriya naseleniya i formirovaniu pozitivnogo obschestvennogo mneniya o deyatel'nosti OVD [The goals of the Regional Office of Interior Affairs to improve the trust of the population and shaping the positive public opinion about the work of the offices of interior affairs]*. Volgograd: VLA MVD.
- Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). *Trust in the law. Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Uildriks, N., & Reenen, P. v. (2003). *Policing post-communist societies: Police-public violence, democratic policing and human rights*. Antwerp, Oxford, New York: Intersentia: Open Society Institute.
- Vorob'ev, A. M. (1992). Sotsial'nyi portret rabotnika organov vnutrennih del [Social image of policemen]. *Social Research*, 10, 107–109.
- Vorontsov, A. V. (1997). *Sovershenstvovanie vzaimodeistvia militsii i naseleniya [Improving the interaction between police and population]*. Moscow: Moscow Law Institute of MVD.
- WCIOM. (2001). Reitingi doveriya /nedoveriya institutam obschestva [Ranking of most trustworthy and least trustworthy societal institutions in Russia]. Retrieved June 12, 2006, from www.wciom.ru.
- WCIOM. (2006). Bezopasnost' rossiyan: otsenivaya rabotu militsii, FSB i prokuratury [Safety of Russians: Assessing work of police, FSB and procuracy]. Retrieved October 7, 2007 from www.wciom.ru.
- Yelin, A. (2001). Police, security and democracy: A police perspective of the Russian experience during times of transition. In S. Einstein & M. Amir (Eds.), *Policing, security and democracy: Theory and practice*. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, the University of Illinois at Chicago.
- ZIRCON. (2001). Obschestvennoe mnenie ob organah gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti [Public opinion about the state security agencies]. April 5, 2006, from www.zircon.ru.
- Zvekic, U. (1996). Policing and attitudes toward police private in countries in transition. *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing firsthand knowledge with experience from the West*, Retrieved May 10, 2006, from <http://www.ncjrs.gov/policing/contents.html>.

K. Michael Reynolds, PhD, joined the Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida in 1997. He has focused on criminal justice policy issues, crime analysis, information systems, and the internationalization of the criminal justice system. He recently received a Fulbright Scholarship and was in Russia four months conducting research and teaching. Dr. Reynolds has published numerous articles and received invitations to present his research at national and international conferences.

Olga B. Semukhina is a research associate at University of Central Florida (UCF). She received her MS in criminal justice from UCF in 2001 and PhD in Public Affairs from UCF in 2007. She also holds LLB and LLM degrees from Tomsk State University in Russia. Her research interests include comparative criminal procedure, criminal procedure of international institutions, transnational crimes, comparative policing, and international standards of due process.

Nikolai N. Demidov is an associate professor at Volgograd Law Academy, MVD, and a deputy chair of the Philosophy Department. He graduated from Volgograd State Pedagogical University with a specialist degree in social sciences in 1973. He received his PhD in philosophy from St. Petersburg State University in 1992. His research interests include sociology of deviant behavior, social issues of personal safety, juvenile justice, and sociological aspects of public-police contacts. He is an author of 15 articles and books on Russian police.