


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Stuart Henry^a & Mark M. Lanier^b

^a Valparaiso University

^b University of Central Florida

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THE PRISM OF CRIME: ARGUMENTS FOR AN INTEGRATED DEFINITION OF CRIME*

STUART HENRY
Valparaiso University

MARK M. LANIER
University of Central Florida

The recent criminological trend toward theoretical integration lacks an integrated definition of crime. Effective integration requires a comprehensive incorporation of the multiple definitions of crime, including moral consensus, rule-relativism, political conflict, power, and social harm, because each contributes important but restricted insights. Rather than alternatives, these definitions are mutually constitutive. Developments in critical theory indicate a new, integrated way forward, which we have incorporated into a prism of crime. This framework consolidates aspects of the continuous dimensions of harm, seriousness, extensiveness, social agreement, social response, context, and visibility. It reframes criminology's subject matter to reflect more clearly the totality of criminal harm, especially that generated by relations of the powerful of their victimization of the powerless.

Since 1979 a theoretical trend in criminology has emerged, which many find invigorating. Instead of developing new theories that compete to supersede all others, some theorists have attempted to combine what they view as the best elements of these diverse positions (Barak 1998; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Braithwaite 1989; Colvin and Pauly 1983; Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton 1985; Johnson 1979; Messner, Krohn, and Liska 1989; Pearson and Weiner 1985; Tittle 1995). It can be argued that theory development has always been integrationist, at least if that term is taken to mean building on and incorporating earlier theoretical developments. Einstadter and Henry (1995:302), however, point out that these new approaches involve "explicit rather than implied integration." As Barak (1998:187) explains, those who advocate a "more explicit" approach to integration do so for a variety of reasons including a desire to arrive at central anchoring notions in theory,

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to provide coherence to a bewildering array of fragmented theories, for comprehensiveness and completeness to advance scientific progress, and to synthesize causation and social control. He says, "Integrative ways of viewing crime and criminals are preferable to nonintegrative or singular ways because the former affords the key to obtaining the fullest possible picture of the nature of crime and social control, whereas the latter provides only partial and incomplete pictures of the phenomenon" (1998:2).

Theoretical integration has been defined as "the combination of two or more pre-existing theories, selected on the basis of their perceived commonalties, into a single reformulated theoretical model with greater comprehensiveness and explanatory value than any one of its component theories" (Farnworth 1989:95). Thus, for example, one component of integrated theory may focus on the learning process, another on the impact of social control, and a third on the effects of the class structure or social ecology in which these processes are located. For example, Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming incorporates elements of control theory, labeling theory, subcultural theory, opportunity or strain theory, and social learning theory (Braithwaite 1989; also see Tittle 1995).

Several problems are debated in the integration literature. These include whether propositional integration is preferable to conceptual integration; the logic of causal relations between propositions; the appropriate nature of causality (linear, multiple, interactive, or reciprocal/dialectical); and whether theories should be integrated at the same level of analysis (micro-micro; macro-macro) or across levels (macro-micro) (see Barak 1998; Barlow 1995). The problem least often addressed, however, is the nature of the phenomenon that integration is supposed to explain, namely crime.

Considerable progress has been made to integrate the causal dimensions of the diverse range of theories, though not without criticism (Akers 1994; Einstadter and Henry 1995; Gibbons 1994; Hirschi 1979), but little has been said about integrating definitions of crime. Even Barak's recent major statement on integration relies on a review of various definitional components but does not integrate them (1998:21-27). Thus, within integrated theory, crime typically remains a taken-for-granted concept and one that relies on state legal definitions, which leave out the multiple components of the crime phenomenon. As a result, we are still uncertain about what integration is intended to explain. Is it an explanation for crime in general, for legally defined crime, for a specific type of crime, or for harmful behaviors, regardless of whether these are defined as crime?

Our purpose here is neither to review attempts at theoretical integration nor to describe the integrative process. Instead we aim to make the case for a conceptual framework that integrates the seemingly contradictory paradigms of crime into a comprehensive but open-ended definition. To do so, we must formulate a concept of crime that takes account of the diversity of definitional dimensions constituting crime, and we must begin to explore their interrelationship. In constructing such a framework we believe that integrational efforts should respect the differences between definitional positions, thereby "retaining their integrity as part of the array of approaches instead of meshing them together with the risk of losing what is unique about their contribution" (Einstadter and Henry 1995:302). The definitional framework also should show how these different approaches are interrelated. Thus our approach, although ambitious, brings together the diversity of definitions while simultaneously retaining their individual contributions to the debate.

We further believe that any resulting framework of definitional integration should be open to emergent developments, thus allowing new forms of crime to be grafted onto the model. In this we aim to provide a flexible but comprehensive view of the constitutive dimensions of crime, in agreement with Butler's (1992) postmodern notion of "contingent universalities" but also mindful of Arrigo's (1995) argument that integration "is not a systematic, reconstitutive closure to possibilities; rather, it is an opening-up to multiple, discordant, and different expressions by which meaning and being are articulated" (p.465).

We attempt to accomplish this integrational definitional framework by considering the work of the few scholars who have addressed the issue, drawing particularly on the integrational insights of left realism, postmodernist constitutive theory, and especially Hagan's (1977, 1985) pyramid of crime. First we briefly outline the various existing approaches to defining crime.

PREVAILING DEFINITIONAL DIMENSIONS

Although it is possible to identify multiple dimensions that influence definitions of crime, these emerge from six basic traditions: legal, moral consensus, rule-relativism, political conflict, power, and social harm. The legal definition of crime refers to acts prohibited, prosecuted, and punished by criminal law (Michael and Adler 1933:5). It asserts that some acts are selectively banned and punished by government, whose concern is expressed through legal sanctions on law violators. In pointing to the limitations of this definition, critics have expanded the scope of the subject and have thrown into relief its other components.

Those who attempt to anchor the legal definition of crime to a universal sense of morality define crime as the most serious harms or acts of norm violation that shock the common conscience, such that no serious crime has occurred where moral outrage is lacking (Burgess 1950; Durkheim [1893] 1933; Roshier 1989). The moral consensus approach contributes to integration the idea that there is a shared vision of the seriousness of some acts, regardless of whether these have been defined as crimes in law.

Rule-relativists and social constructionists argue that what is defined as crime in law is historically, temporarily and culturally relative (Becker 1963; Gould, Kleck, and Gertz 1992; Tift 1995). Their insight highlights the role of changing rather than absolute values regarding crime. In a related vein, conflict theorists argue that what is defined as crime depends on possessing the power to define and the power to resist definitions (Chambliss and Seidman [1971]; Pavarini 1994; Quinney 1973). This idea suggests the importance of powerful groups and class interests in determining what behavior captures the cultural moment. This point, in turn, depends on who has access to the media, and on how skilled moral entrepreneurs use it to their advantage (Barak 1994; Pfuhl and Henry 1993; Schur 1980; Surette 1997). The conflict literature, like labeling theory, also underscores the power dimension involved in selecting some behaviors over others as criminal; it also emphasizes how, in the process, some harmful behavior is rendered invisible.

Critical theorists expand the legal definition by giving priority to “social harm” or “analogous social injury” as central to any definition of crime. Their analysis serves the integrative project by exposing the ways in which law conceals serious harmful behavior, either by constructing less serious “administrative” categories, as first revealed by Sutherland (1949), or by excluding some of the harms from the criminal realm, such as imperialism, racism, sexism, poverty, and other denials of human rights (Cohen 1993; Michalowski 1985; Reiman 1979; Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970; Tift 1995; Von Hirsch and Jareborg 1991). From an integrative perspective these commentators sensitize us to both the visibility/invisibility dimension of crime and the power relations within which the content of crime is contested (Butler 1997).


Although each of these perspectives on what counts, or should count, as crime contributes its own insights, to date only three attempts have been made to integrate them into a holistic framework. Two of these, the left realist and the postmodernist-constitutive, stemming from the critical tradition, are implicit. The third, Hagan’s pyramidal approach, is explicit. Below we examine these

proto-integrational definitional approaches to crime, and then outline our own position.

Left Realists' "Square of Crime"

Several of the early efforts to define crime were captured in the left realists' notion of the "square of crime" (Young 1992). Left realists incorporated the concepts discussed above into a coherent schema that presents the four minimal elements necessary for a crime (see Figure 1). The square includes agents of social control as well as the specific criminal event (Young 1992, 1997). The four corners are (1) the offender, (2) the victim, (3) police multi-agencies, and (4) the public. The "offender" element implies that an offensive behavior must occur and be committed by an actor; the "victim" implies that someone is hurt or harmed by the offender's action; "police" implies that the offense elicits a formal response by agencies of government enforcing the law; and the "public" implies the existence of an informal community or collective sense of the act as an offense. The realists' contribution suggests that each of these elements must be present and must interact socially to produce crime. It also suggests that each element can change both in itself and in relation to the others, depending on time, space, and social situation (DeKeseredy, MacLean, and Schwartz 1997; Young 1997).

Figure 1. Young's "Square of Crime"



Source: Young (1992:48).

The left realist definition of crime indicates possibilities for integration but ultimately fails to deliver because realists wish to show how interaction between the elements produces real crimes rather than to explain what elements make the event a crime or not a crime. In addition, their schema tends to be framed in terms of


street crime; it does not incorporate or apply to crimes of the powerful (Henry forthcoming). This omission is corrected by the postmodernists' constitutive integration.

Postmodernists' "Constitution of Crime"

The postmodernist constitutive approach to defining crime analyzes more extensively how investment in power shapes definitions of crime, a point first introduced by conflict and critical theorists. Constitutive theory, however, takes this notion beyond powerful groups and classes to power relations in situational and global contexts (Foucault 1980). For example, Henry and Milovanovic's (1996:104) constitutive theory defines crime as an agency's ability to make a difference to others, where

crimes are nothing less than moments in the expression of power such that those who are subjected to these expressions are denied their own contribution to the encounter and often to future encounters. Crime then is the power to deny others . . . in which those subject to the power of another, suffer the pain of being denied their own humanity, the power to make a difference. (Henry and Milovanovic 1994:119)

Henry and Milovanovic acknowledge the radical/critical theorists' point that humans have rights such as the right to nutrition, nurturance, health, and life. They also accept the anarchist criminologists' argument that these include the right to be free to develop potentialities and to be protected from predators who use power to undermine such development (DiCristina 1995; Ferrell 1997; Tift 1995; Tift and Sullivan 1980). To accommodate both these dimensions, Henry and Milovanovic (1996:103) distinguish between "harms of reduction" and "harms of repression" (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Henry and Milovanovic's Constitution of Crime

Source: Henry and Milovanovic (1996:101).

Harms of reduction occur when an offended party experiences a loss of some quality with respect to his or her present standing, which results from another's action. Harms of repression result from the actions of another that limit or restrict a person from achieving a future desired position or standing, though this would be achieved without harming others. Henry and Milovanovic (1996) describe harms of reduction and repression as committed by "excessive investors" in power, and reconceptualize the victim as a "recovering subject" who is in a continual state of transformation of self. Harms of repression also have been described as crimes against human dignity, "acts and conditions that obstruct the spontaneous unfolding of human potential" (Tift 1995:9).

This criminalization of the use of power to reduce or suppress another person is particularly important in exposing the previously

hidden crimes of gender oppression, sexual harassment, hate crime, and racism that critical theorists have long complained are neglected in the legal and consensus definitions. It is also central to the unveiling of white-collar, corporate, and state crimes. Indeed, the analysis of power relations in the creation of crime highlights the intersecting forces of class, race, and gender relations, which coalesce in law and social institutions to legitimize harm and thereby to make legalized relations into relations of harm. Therefore it follows that law itself can create crime—not merely by definition, as labeling theorists argue, but by its use of power over others and its concealment of the harms others under the protection of law (Tifft 1995; Young and Rush 1994). Quinney's (1977) radical theory described such crimes as "crimes of domination and repression," which included not only the legal harms resulting from economic domination in a capitalist society, but also the crimes of government and of their agencies of social control.

Thus Henry and Milovanovic's postmodern constitutive approach integrates (1) power relationships as active creators of harm, (2) the invisibility of many harms, (3) the changing basis of crime as harm, (4) the changing collective reaction to what counts as harm, and (5) the variability in the nature of offenders (ranging from individual and collective actors to processes and policies) and victims (whether individuals or social groups). In addition, and in keeping with Butler's (1992) notion of "contingent universalities," Henry and Milovanovic's constitutive approach to defining crime is open-ended, allowing new forms to be added. Indeed, according to Arrigo,

Postmodern conceptual analysis is not concerned with the scope and magnitude with which it accounts for *the* conditions or *the* causes of social problems. It seeks, however, to understand the manifold and ever-changing ways in which disparate groups communicate and give meaning to local sites of crime, justice, law, and community. Thus the idea of postmodern integration refers to its relational, positional, and provisional function to interpret, reinterpret, validate,, and repudiate *multiple discourses* (1995:465)

Together the postmodern constitutive contribution and the left realist position reintroduce to criminology the centrality of the victim and highlight the social and situational context in any definition of crime. Both approaches move us toward an increasingly broad range of interrelated and contingent dimensions that constitute crime. Yet although they are an improvement over earlier definitions, which simply presented multiple alternatives, their attempt to integrate loses some of the simplicity and integrity that

marked the various dimensions before they were integrated. In contrast, John Hagan's (1977, 1985) idea of crime as a continuous variable is one of the few approaches that explicitly attempts to incorporate several of the dimensions discussed while retaining their clear, distinctive contributions. As we shall see however, it was developed before the left realist and postmodern constitutive theories, and consequently lacks critical awareness.

Hagan's "Pyramid of Crime"

In an insightful synthesis, Hagan (1977, 1985) argues that rule breaking ranges from minor deviance from accepted standards of behavior, such as public drunkenness or dress code violations, to highly offensive acts involving serious harm, such as urban terrorism or mass murder. Indeed, he defines crime as "a kind of deviance, which in turn consists of variation from a social norm that is proscribed by criminal law" (1985:49). Hagan thus recognizes (1) the social constructionists' and critical theorists' idea of the relativity of crime via norm violation, (2) the legal tradition of law violation, (3) a limited version of the consensus on serious crimes, and (4) the critical theorists' view that harm is an essential element in the construction of crime. These definitional traditions are reflected in Hagan's three measures of seriousness, each ranging from low/weak to high/strong.

First, drawing on the moral tradition in defining crime, is the degree of consensus or agreement: the degree to which people accept an act as right or wrong. Hagan says that the degree of consensus or agreement about the wrongfulness of an act "can range from confusion and apathy, through levels of disagreement to conditions of general agreement" (1985:49). This point is supported by victimization surveys, which reveal that most people believe planting a bomb in a public building and causing serious death or injury is very wrong, but few consider a 16-year-old's skipping school a serious misdeed (BJS 1983).

The second dimension of Hagan's approach, drawing on the legal tradition, is the severity of society's formal response through law. This may range from social avoidance or an official warning, through fines and imprisonment, to expulsion from society or ultimately the death penalty. Hagan argues that "the more severe the penalty prescribed, and the more extensive the support for this sanction, the more serious is the societal evaluation of the act" (1985:49).


Hagan's third dimension, touching on the contribution of radical and critical theory, is the relative seriousness of crime based on the harm it has caused. He argues that some acts, such as drug

use, gambling, and prostitution, are victimless crimes, harming only the participants. Many other crimes, such as domestic violence, harm others; some harm more than one person at a time. Despite a limited conception of the role of power in framing crime, Hagan at least considers the dimension of harm a major component of any definition of crime.

Hagan illustrates the integration of these three dimensions on his "pyramid of crime" (see Figure 3). From the integrational perspective, he claims that

the three measures of seriousness are closely associated . . . the more serious acts of deviance, which are most likely to be called "criminal," are likely to involve (1) broad agreement about the wrongfulness of such acts, (2) a severe social response, and (3) an evaluation of being very harmful. However, the correlation between these three dimensions certainly is not perfect, and . . . in regard to many acts that are defined as crimes, there is disagreement as to their wrongfulness, an equivocal social response, and uncertainty in perceptions of their harmfulness. (Hagan 1985:50)

Figure 3. Hagan's Pyramid of Crime



Source: Hagan (1977:14).

THE LIMITS OF HAGAN'S PYRAMID: TOWARD A CRITICAL-INTEGRATIVE DEFINITION

Although Hagan goes farther than most in attempting an explicit integrated definition of crime, we suggest that his pyramid is incomplete for several reasons. Each of these pertains to his failure to adequately consider the importance of radical/critical and

postmodernist discussion of power relations in the definitional process that we discussed above. As a result, Hagan's pyramid neglects (1) the visibility of crime, (2) the extensiveness of crime, and (3) the selectivity of severe responses to crime.

Visibility

The issue of visibility is important not least because it highlights the social constructionists' contribution: how the public becomes aware that acts are harmful. Thus, when the visibility dimension is omitted, the social construction of victimization is ignored. Hagan takes for granted the public awareness, and variability in the public perception of seriousness remains an unanalyzed given. Crime takes many forms, all of which involve harm, but not all of those who are harmed realize that they have been victimized. Labeling theorists such as Schur (1965) argued that participants in victimless crime may disclaim the criminal label. Yet as conflict and radical theorists have observed in the case of victims of government and corporate crime, often a long time passes before victims become aware that they have been harmed; many may never realize it (Barak 1991; Box 1983; Friedrichs 1996; Poveda 1994). For example, the effects of environmental crime may be so slow and so diffused that no one notices any harm or change in the environment (Clifford 1998). Over a period of years, however, a particular area may become uninhabitable because of such crime. Its harmful effects can result in "insidious injuries" when the links between the causes and the effects are obscure, take a long time to appear, affect only a segment of the population, result in increased risk of injury or disease, and are dispersed widely through the population (Calhoun and Hiller 1986).

This dimension therefore is important: As critical theorists contend, the visibility of crime partly reflects the force of existing legal definitions, which themselves are shaped by powerful economic, political and class interests (Chambliss and Seidman 1982; Quinney 1977). These interests, in turn, partly reflect the commercial interests of the mass media; which limit their framing of the crime question (Barak 1994; Surette 1997). In part, too, they reflect the popular culture's trivialization and sensationalization of direct interpersonal "true crimes" in preference to complex, diffuse social harms and injuries that have become institutionalized, compartmentalized, privatized, and justified via the legitimate goals of the organization (Ermann and Lundman 1995; Poveda 1994).

Thus we argue that visibility must be included. We suggest that crime can range from being "obvious" or "readily apparent," as a result of its prominence in the popular culture, mass-mediated

news, and tabloid journalism (Barak 1994, 1998), to being “relatively hidden,” and finally, to being so “obscure” that it is accepted by many as normal, even though it harms its victims. Such acceptance has been demonstrated by feminist criminologists and writers on critical race theory with respect to patriarchy and racism.

Extensiveness

A second missing (though implied) part of the “pyramid of crime” is the extensiveness of victimization. Again, Hagan does not develop this dimension. This is unfortunate because, from the perspective of critical literature, it is an integral component of public perceptions of seriousness. Superficially it seems that if only one person is affected by crime, this is tragic and serious. Yet such a crime is somehow qualitatively different from acts of violence that affect many people, as in terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma bombing or environmental pollution such as Union Carbide’s chemical disaster in Bhopal. Deeper analysis, however, shows that extensiveness is a more complex dimension. Although the number of persons injured influences public perceptions of seriousness, this dimension itself is shaped by the differential value placed on human lives. As critical and postmodernist theory implies, it is easy to assume a correspondence between absolute numbers and the seriousness of crime if one lacks a conception of the social hierarchy of power relationships and the importance of social distance.

Perceptions of seriousness also depend on *who* is the victim. The death of Princess Diana, victimized by a coincidence of drunk driving, media hounding, and royal risk taking, may be viewed as more serious than the victimization of thousands by tobacco companies’ advertising or the targeting of millions of youths by the alcohol industry’s promotion of party culture—at least if public expressions of grief are any indication. Similarly, with regard to media presentations and discussions of crime in the United States, genocide in Pol Pot’s Cambodia or in Rwanda are regarded as less serious than the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson; the death of homosexual men from HIV/AIDS is considered less important than the death of heterosexual women from the same illness. This distinction is related to differences in importance attached to human life, based on people’s social and political status in a hierarchically ordered society and on the social distance and divisions that complex societies create between human beings. In short, it pertains to socially constructed differences created between those with whom we identify and “others” with whom we cannot.

Selectivity of Severe Responses

A third limitation of Hagan's pyramid relates to the dimension of severity of response. This dimension fails to capture the probability or likelihood that an offender will receive a serious official response, even though the law may set such a penalty. As radical and critical perspectives have demonstrated, the law is selectively responsive to harmful offenses, even when these are defined by the criminal law; crimes of the powerless are far more likely to receive the full weight of the law than are crimes of the powerful (Box 1983; Calavita and Pontell 1993; Friedrichs 1996). Indeed, the severity of response to some offenders' crimes depends on their race rather than on the act itself, as in the disproportionate penalties (10:1) for smoking crack cocaine, which is favored by African-Americans, in comparison with penalties for snorting powder cocaine, as favored by Caucasians (DeKeseredy and Schwartz 1996; Russell 1998; Schwartz and Milovanovic 1996).

The Pyramidal Structure


A final limitation of Hagan's analysis is its visual structure. The pyramid does not allow these other elements to be included: It implies that where conflict exists concerning the criminality of some acts, these acts are only somewhat harmful. As we have argued, however, crimes may be extremely harmful but still may not be perceived as harms by society, or by several sectors of society. We believe that Hagan's analysis can be developed considerably by adding the three dimensions that reflect conflict, radical, social constructionist, and postmodernist conceptions of power relations, and by reconfiguring the pyramid into a "prism" of crime. In our initial statement on this construction (Lanier and Henry, 1998) we outlined the form this prism may take. Below we briefly summarize our position and discuss the value of such a schema for an integrated perspective on crime.

THE PRISM OF CRIME

To solve the problems in Hagan's pyramid we suggested redesigning its visual presentation into a double pyramid or what we call the prism of crime (Lanier and Henry 1998; see Figure 4 below). Accordingly we placed an inverted pyramid beneath the first pyramid. The upper pyramid represents the highly visible crimes, typically those of the structurally powerless, which are committed in public. These include offenses such as robbery, theft, auto theft, burglary, assault, murder, stranger rape, and arson. These crimes

are similar to many of those which for years the FBI has called “index crimes.” The lower, inverted pyramid represents relatively invisible crimes, which include a variety of crimes of the powerful. These are offenses by government officials, corporations, and organizations; crimes that people commit through their occupations, such as fraud and embezzlement; and even some offenses such as date rape, sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexism, racism, ageism, and crimes of hate. These crimes typically are perpetrated in private settings such as organizations, workplaces, and homes, and involve violations of trusted relationships. Together the crimes of the powerless and the crimes of the powerful constitute the visible and invisible halves of our prism.

Figure 4. The Prism of Crime



Source: Lanier and Henry (1998:28).

In our earlier statement (Lanier and Henry 1998:28-30) we discussed the mechanics of the prism, illustrating and elaborating on how the dimensions of social agreement, probable social response, individual and social harm, and extent of victimization provide a more comprehensive framework for locating the full range of crimes than is possible within the limited range of the pyramid. Here, in keeping with the theme of this article, we develop the argument that incorporation of these critical dimensions into a definitional framework makes possible a more comprehensive, and more integrated approach that is also sensitive to emergent forms of harm creation.

The increasingly complex visible representations of crime, from the “square of crime” (Young 1992) to the “constitution of crime”

(Henry and Milovanovic 1996), when fused with the “pyramid of crime” (Hagan 1985) in our “crime prism” (Lanier and Henry 1998), graphically illustrate the increasingly recognized complexity of defining crime. A prism produces or analyzes a continuous spectrum: What appears to be uniform white light can be seen in its constituent parts, which together make up the spectrum. Our crime prism similarly allows us to view the integral components of crime while simultaneously viewing it as a whole.

This dual view, encompassing the particular and the whole, is important if we are to understand the complexity of crime. As one of our reviewers suggested, terrorism would seem to be an obviously serious and noncontroversial crime. Yet are organizations such as Greenpeace considered terrorist? Nor are all terrorists necessarily violent. Were the Vietnam protesters who burned their draft cards terrorists? What about “terrorist” acts funded and supported by governments? In one’s perspective or worldview, these may or may not be considered terrorist acts.

Our original conception of the prism (Lanier and Henry 1998) included a colored spectrum of light, just as in a real prism, that represented these constitutive dimensions. These dimensions have several implications for the way we examine crime.

First, the position of crimes in the prism varies over time. As vocal dominant groups and mass-mediated culture focus on different issues, so the public awareness of what counts as crime is formed and re-formed. In such formation, acts are recognized as more or less visible, more or less serious, and more or less harmful. For example, the positions of domestic violence and sexual harassment have changed: Both recently have begun to move from the lower to the upper half of the prism. In contrast, other acts that formerly were located in the upper half, such as some religious offenses (e.g. working on Sunday), have become so common as to be hidden, are relatively harmless, and elicit neither public sentiment nor societal response. In short, the prism of crime is not static, but a dynamic model of changes, over time, in what counts as crime.

Second, the upper half of the prism (Hagan’s pyramid) contains predominantly conventional crimes or “street crimes,” whereas the lower half contains white-collar crimes, or “suite crimes.” Some observers have suggested that those committing most of the street crimes are relatively powerless in society, whereas those committing most of the suite crimes hold structural positions of power (Balkan, Berger, and Schmidt 1980; Box 1983).

What does the possession of power affect? Does it influence the type of crime that is committed, the ability to escape the effects of

the law, or both? In view of these questions, suite crimes are located in the bottom segment of our crime prism. They are very harmful but are obscured; they harm their victims indirectly and diffusely. Often the victims do not realize who the offender is, or perhaps even that they have been victimized. They are blamed for being stupid, careless, or unfortunate (as in the savings and loan fraud, pollution, and food poisoning). Only recently has society begun to react to these offenses, and then only feebly, through selective regulatory control rather than criminalization.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

We began this paper by suggesting that integrative theory has failed to develop an integrative definition of crime, the object of its analysis. We have returned to the literature on multiple definitions; through a development of Hagan's analysis, into which we incorporated insights from the critical literature, we have produced an integrated approach to defining crime, represented by the prism. We believe that the prism takes into account the major constitutive dimensions of what counts as crime. By locating crimes on the prism, integrational theorists can specify more clearly what their theory explains.

We are not suggesting that this schema is definitive, nor even that it is the most comprehensive visual representation. (For example, holographic forms may permit greater complexity to be displayed.) Nor is this schema particularly elegant, in the traditional sense of theory construction. Moreover, it will not satisfy those who fundamentally disagree with the integrationalist project, and who regard it as a flawed undertaking. Part of the problem here is (to quote one of our reviewers) that any attempt to concretize, especially in schematic form, "violates the very sort of fractured, ambiguous, postmodern approaches which some of us find enjoyable."

We believe, however, that it is possible to capture the contingent and changing nature of crime, while simultaneously locating its constitutive features in a framework that allows criminologists to see their combined and interactive effects. Indeed, our prism enables theorists to see how specific crimes are related to one another and to the wider social forces that intersect with those crimes at certain moments in time; rendering some acts, rather than others, serious crimes and throwing previously concealed victimizations into relief.

We further contend that until all victims are identified clearly and their suffering is given a voice, until crimes of the powerful are

brought to public awareness, until governments are more fully representative of the people than of industrial and special interest lobbyists, and until we begin to scrutinize the injustices in private organizations and institutions, as closely as we attend to the flaws of public settings, these harms will be located low on the crime prism. Such an outcome has serious consequences for criminology and public policy, to say nothing of social justice.

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